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ABSTRACT 
For over 25 years, the U.S. Navy contracted with Glenn Defense Marine Asia 
(GDMA) to provide husbanding services. In 2013, the Justice Department announced an 
investigation alleging that for years, GDMA had engaged in procurement fraud. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze Navy husbanding service contracting using 
the Fat Leonard case through the lens of auditability theory, applying contract management 
and internal control frameworks. This research analyzes each alleged act of fraud in the Fat 
Leonard case and aligns the act with the contract management phase in which the alleged act 
occurred and with the internal control component that most contributed to and allowed the 
alleged act to be perpetrated.  
The research findings identified collusion as the primary fraud scheme in the Fat 
Leonard case. Research findings show that the alleged acts of fraud occurred primarily in the 
buyer’s contract administration and procurement planning phases and in the seller’s pre-sales 
activity and contract administration phases. Furthermore, the findings indicate that the 
internal control deficiencies were in the control environment and information and 
communication components. Based on these findings, recommendations are provided to 
improve the auditability of husbanding service contracting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
For over 25 years, the U.S. Navy contracted with a Singapore-based firm, Glenn 
Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), to provide husbanding services for Navy ships making port 
calls in the Asia/Pacific region (Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). 
The firm was led by a Malaysian national, Leonard Glenn Francis, also known by Navy 
personnel as “Fat Leonard” because of his large stature.  
Since Navy ships routinely make visits to ports of call that lack organic Navy support, 
husbanding support providers (HSPs) are typically contracted to provide support. HSPs 
arrange for and provide items such as force protection equipment and services, food and 
water, and fuel. They schedule tugboats to shepherd ships in and out of port, facilitate the 
removal and disposal of oily and human wastes, provide water taxi services, and provide 
vehicles and transportation services, as well as a host of other incidental services associated 
with a ship’s port visit (Naval Audit Service, 2014). Husbanding services are particularly 
hard to manage as they involve large volumes of liquids such as wastewater or fuel. These 
services are often rendered in remote locations where competition is limited, and where 
barriers, such as language and cultural differences, exist. Personnel who are not experts in 
contract management typically monitor these contracts. Furthermore, the majority of Navy 
vessels lack technology (such as flow meters) to measure the movement of various liquids to 
and from the ship.  
In 2013, the Department of Justice publicly revealed that, for years, Fat Leonard had 
secured Navy husbanding service contracts and conducted business through illicit 
procurement fraud schemes such as bribery, bid rigging, and fraudulent invoice submission 
(Whitlock, 2016b). This research study reviews the Fat Leonard case through the lens of 
auditability theory to provide lessons learned to the Navy. Specifically, Power (1996) states 
that processes must be made auditable. Rendon and Rendon (2015) introduce the Auditability 
Triangle that establishes a conceptual framework, which asserts that procurement fraud can 
be mitigated through having competent personnel, developing capable processes, and 
establishing effective internal controls.  
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B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to analyze Navy husbanding services contracting using 
the Fat Leonard case through the lens of auditability theory, applying contract management 
and internal control frameworks. Findings from this research will be used to develop 
recommendations that seek to improve Navy husbanding services contracting by enhancing 
the competency of all process stakeholders, improving contract management process 
capabilities, and strengthening internal controls. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research addresses the following research questions: 
1. In which contracting processes did the alleged acts of procurement fraud 
occur in the Fat Leonard case relating to Navy husbanding services? 
2. What internal controls were deficient that permitted the alleged acts of 
procurement fraud to occur in the Fat Leonard case relating to Navy 
husbanding services? 
3. What were the specific alleged procurement fraud schemes that occurred in 
the Fat Leonard case relating to Navy husbanding services? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research study analyzes the Fat Leonard case through the lens of auditability 
theory, using contract management and internal control frameworks. This study specifically 
analyzes alleged procurement fraud incidents, the phase of the contract management process 
in which the fraud scheme occurred, and which internal control component was associated 
with each fraud scheme. This methodology includes the development of a database that 
consists of publicly available criminal indictments and other court documents related to the 
Fat Leonard case. 
E. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
Procurement fraud is an ongoing issue within the DOD. An analysis of real world 
fraud cases can provide insight through which the DOD can gain lessons learned to develop 
individual competencies, improve contract management processes, and strengthen internal 
controls. This research study is important because it seeks to develop recommendations 
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rooted in auditability theory that can be employed by Navy leadership to deter fraud in Navy 
HSP contracting. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This study has several limitations. One limitation is that this study is based on 
allegations of fraud that were extracted from publicly available criminal indictments and 
other court documents related to the Fat Leonard case that were available as of September 30, 
2017. While several personnel have pleaded guilty as of the date of this report, those plea 
agreements remain sealed. As a result, the public is not able to determine the specific acts of 
fraud to which each person actually pled guilty. 
Another limitation is that the alignment of each alleged act of fraud to a contract 
management phase and internal control component is subjective in nature. In many cases, 
there was an overlap between contract management phases and internal control components. 
Each act of alleged fraud was aligned with the contract management phase in which the 
preponderance of activity took place. Additionally, each alleged act of fraud was aligned 
with the primary internal control component that had deficiencies that most contributed to 
and allowed the fraudulent act to occur. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This report consists of six chapters, including this introduction chapter. Chapter II 
provides a literature review of the Navy’s husbanding contracting environment to include 
past and current problems and actions taken by the Navy to address those problems. The 
chapter also discusses auditability theory, contract management processes, internal control 
components, and fraud schemes. Chapter III provides a history of GDMA, a timeline of its 
contracting activity with the United States Navy, and a timeline of its ultimate demise. 
Chapter IV provides the methodology by which this research study was conducted and 
describes a database of allegations of fraud that was developed to conduct the research. 
Chapter V presents the research findings, provides the analysis, and explains the implications 
of the findings. Chapter V also provides recommendations to enhance the competency of 
HSP contract process stakeholders, improve HSP contract management process capabilities, 
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and strengthen internal controls. Chapter VI provides a summary of the research and presents 
the conclusions and areas for further research. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided an introduction and background on Navy husbanding relating 
to the Fat Leonard case. It discussed the purpose of analyzing the Fat Leonard case to 
produce recommendations that improve the auditability of husbanding service contracting. 
Next, the chapter presented the research questions that will be addressed in this study. It also 
presented the methodology, as well as the importance and limitations of the research. Finally, 
this chapter presented the organization of the report. The next chapter presents a literature 
review that covers the Navy’s husbanding contracting environment to include past and 
current problems, actions taken by the Navy to address those problems, auditability theory, 
contract management processes, internal control components, and fraud schemes. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The literature review includes peer-reviewed articles, newspaper articles, and 
government documents related to contracting management processes, internal controls, and 
procurement fraud schemes. This chapter first reviews the literature on husbanding processes 
used in the Navy (both pre- and post-GDMA) and husbanding processes used in the private 
sector. Next, the chapter discusses auditability theory and its associated components of 
competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal controls. Next, the contract 
management framework is discussed and is presented from both the buying and selling 
perspective. A discussion of the Integrated Internal Control Framework is then presented. 
Finally, this chapter ends by presenting the six most common procurement fraud schemes. 
The Navy husbanding process is discussed in the following section. 
B. NAVY HUSBANDING PROCESS 
U.S. Navy vessels (ships and submarines) routinely sail into foreign ports for various 
reasons while away from home to include liberty, multi-national exercises, and resupply 
efforts. Ships require a myriad of support functions during port visits, such as tugboats, 
pilotage, fuel, trash removal, rental vehicles, and cargo drayage. For many years, the U.S. 
Navy has relied on husbanding support providers (HSPs) to provide these services during 
port visits and liaison with the local port and community on their behalf. The next section 
includes a discussion of the husbanding service support process employed by the Navy prior 
to the Fat Leonard case. 
1. Pre-Fat Leonard Case Husbanding Processes 
Four commands were involved in the husbanding process, including the numbered 
fleet commander, the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), the servicing Fleet 
Industrial Supply Center (FISC, now Fleet Logistics Center [FLC]), and the unit’s respective 
type commander (TYCOM). The numbered fleet commander was in charge of each vessel 
operationally when a unit sailed into their area of operations (AOR), and the TYCOM had 
administrative command and issued governing supply and financial policy. NAVSUP and 
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FISC performed support roles. NAVSUP developed and implemented the overarching 
contracting policy, while FISC awarded husbanding contracts (Burson, 2011). The TYCOM 
was responsible for providing operating funds to the ship, including funds to pay for port 
visits. TYCOM provided funding to ships in two categories: Equipment Maintenance and 
Repair Money (EMRM) and “Other” money for consumable items and services, to include 
husbanding. A specific fund code designated each service so ships could identify what they 
purchased with “Other” funding. Upon completion of a port visit, TYCOM directed the 
ship’s supply officer to prepare a port visit cost report (PVCR) and submit via naval message 
to their respective TYCOM no later than five days after leaving port. The PVCR was broken 
into categories via the different fund codes that TYCOM specified ships use to pay for 
different line items (e.g., passenger vehicle rental, communications, and charter & hire 
(Commander, Naval Surface Forces [COMNAVSURFOR], 2008). The supply officer 
maintained a separate port visit folder for each port visited over a two-year period. The folder 
contained the original Logistics Requirements (LOGREQ) message (as well as any 
supplemental LOGREQs), copies of all DD Form 1155s (Order for Supplies or Services), 
invoices provided by the husbanding agent, and a copy of the port visit cost report 
(COMNAVSURFOR, 2008). 
The first step initiated by shipboard personnel in the Navy husbanding contracting 
process was for a ship to identify a requirement for support during a port visit. In this 
process, the numbered fleet commander in charge of the ship and the relevant U.S. Embassy 
located in the host country approved these visits. For example, if a ship sailed into the 7th 
Fleet (Western Pacific Ocean) Area of Responsibility (AOR), 7th Fleet would be the final 
approval on all the ship’s port visits with the U.S. Embassy of the proposed country 
providing diplomatic clearance.  
Once a ship secured approval from the fleet commander and diplomatic clearance 
from the U.S. Embassy, the ship was required to submit a LOGREQ. The LOGREQ 
contained essential requirements for the ship to conduct a visit, whether moored pier-side or 
anchored offshore. Items common to a LOGREQ included required tugboats (number and 
size); fender requirements; harbor pilot services; brow services; liberty boat services; trash 
removal; Collection, Holding, and Transfer (CHT) disposal; ship’s vehicles; and others 
(Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command [NAVSUP], 2015). Force protection 
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requirements evolved over time and, especially since 9/11, impress a large burden on the 
crew and husbanding agent to support ever-growing numbered fleet security requirements. 
LOGREQs were difficult to standardize across the fleet given the Navy’s myriad ship and 
submarine classes (Burson, 2011). Once the ship’s Commanding Officer approved the 
LOGREQ, the ship released it via Classified Naval Message to their supporting numbered 
fleet and servicing FISC (COMNAVSURFOR, 2006). Since the message and its contents 
were classified, the ship could not send the message directly to an HSP to begin coordination. 
A representative from the ship, most often the supply officer, would copy the unclassified 
portions into an e-mail message and send it to the HSP to begin coordination efforts.  
As part of this process, each FISC operated independently regarding the award of HSP 
contracts. Some FISCs awarded contracts on a case-by-case basis per each port visit, while 
others would award task orders against existing Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) 
contract instruments. IDIQs are contract instruments that provide for individual task orders or 
delivery orders for the procurement of supplies or services within the scope of the IDIQ. IDIQs 
are used when there is a known requirement for services/material, but the exact delivery dates, 
quantities, or methods are unknown (National Contract Management Association, 2017). HSP 
IDIQ contracts allowed individual units to order directly from the HSP rather than ordering 
through a servicing FISC/FLC. Since the contracting officer had already negotiated prices, the 
ship’s supply officer, who acted as the ordering officer on FISC-awarded husbanding contracts, 
was not required to research requirements ordered via IDIQ or to determine if port services 
costs were “fair and reasonable.” All orders against IDIQs were required to be documented on 
DD Form 1155 and signed by the supply officer (NAVSUP, 2005). It is important to note the 
distinction between an ordering officer and a contracting officer in this case. The commanding 
officer did have the option to designate their supply officers as contracting officers on a SF 
1402, but this did not apply to awarding husbanding service contracts. In the instance where an 
established husbanding service IDIQ was not available, the local FISC would take action based 
upon the ship’s LOGREQ to execute a contract for that particular port visit. After a contract 
was awarded, the ship’s supply officer would act as an ordering officer on the contract. 
After the ship ordered against an IDIQ for husbanding services, or after FISC 
awarded a contract for that particular visit in the absence of an IDIQ, the HSP subcontracted 
out all required services or provided them organically if they possessed the capability. During 
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the port visit, the ship’s supply officer maintained contact with the HSP throughout the port 
visit and was required to maintain receipts and invoices from subcontractors provided for 
services rendered throughout the port visit (COMNAVSURFOR, 2008). At the conclusion of 
the port visit, the HSP would meet with the supply officer onboard the ship to discuss final 
invoices and resolve any disputes regarding invoice totals. The supply officer verified all DD 
1155s against receipts and delivery tickets, then signed and passed the package to the ship’s 
disbursing officer to make payment via U.S. Treasury check or cash (COMNAVSURFOR, 
2008).  
 Since submarines do not possess a disbursing officer function, nor do they have the 
ability to write checks against the U.S. Treasury, the husbanding process for U.S. Navy 
submarines varied from that of surface ships. The Submarine TYCOMs (Commander, 
Submarine Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet; and Commander, Submarine Forces, U.S. Atlantic 
Fleet) worked with the numbered fleets to determine future port visits for their submarines. 
Once the numbered fleet finalized port visit schedules for a particular submarine, the 
Submarine TYCOM Comptrollers reviewed previous PVCRs from these visits to estimate 
costs and augmented that amount to the submarine’s budget. When the submarine completed 
the port visit, the supply officer was required to submit the PVCR no later than five days 
after completion. The Submarine TYCOM Comptrollers would initiate payment to the HSP 
through Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS) based on the PVCR (Burson, 2011).  
This section discussed the process formerly used by the Navy to contract for and 
arrange for husbanding service support prior to the Fat Leonard case. In the next section, the 
industry’s use of husbanding service support is discussed, and key differences between the 
Navy’s and the industry’s use of HSPs are explained. 
2. Differences between Navy and Industry Husbanding Processes 
The commercial shipping industry, specifically freight transport, requires similar 
services as that of U.S. Navy vessels when conducting visits away from home ports. 
However, there are several differences between Navy and industry practices. In terminology, 
the freight industry utilizes a “port agent,” also known as a ship’s agent or agent, instead of 
HSPs. An “agent” being distinguishable from husbanding service “provider” in that an agent 
is contracted to act on behalf of the ship’s owner, where a husbanding service provider can 
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only coordinate for the ship (to the extent of the contract), but cannot obligate the ship or the 
U.S. government financially (Verrastro, 1996). Similar to how the Navy relies on HSPs, the 
commercial shipping industry relies on port agents to coordinate and deliver all required 
services and supplies during a port visit. These services include tugs, pilotage, trash removal, 
cargo drayage, and brow service, as well as all port tariffs and fees (Verrastro, 1996).  
One of the differences between Navy and industry practices is the level of ownership 
delegated to the ship’s agent. A ship’s agent exercises fiduciary responsibility on behalf of 
the ship’s owner, or principal, while the ship is conducting business away from home. The 
Navy places this responsibility on each ship’s commanding officer, who delegates the 
business of husbanding to the ship’s supply officer. Another difference between the Navy 
and industry practices regarding husbanding is that the industry goal is to minimize the 
amount of time that a vessel is in port, thereby saving money and increasing profits. In the 
commercial shipping industry, a ship is not making money for its owner if it is in port 
waiting to get underway or waiting to arrive in port. Conversely, the length of a Navy ship’s 
port visit is specifically designed to support the mission of the ship and the ship’s operational 
commander. Readiness is the primary factor that drives port visit length. For example, a ship 
may conduct a seven-day port visit following extended operations at sea. This port visit is 
designed to provide the crew with downtime, support re-supply and maintenance efforts, and 
also fulfill diplomatic objectives. For example, if the United States has a desire to promote 
cooperation between the Navy and the navy of a foreign government, the ship’s operational 
commander might strategically execute a port visit in that country. By conducting this port 
visit, sailors are given the chance to decompress from rigorous at-sea operations and 
recharge, in-port maintenance and resupply can be completed, and diplomatic objectives are 
fulfilled. Unlike the commercial industry, there is no profit objective assigned to the length of 
a port visit; however, increased time in port by Navy ships can lead to readiness shortfalls. 
Perhaps the greatest difference between Navy and industry practices is that shipping 
firms tend to establish long-term relationships with a particular ship’s agent. The 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) implemented through the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) requires full and open competition for every contract and typically limits 
the length of a service contract term to a maximum of five years, to include option periods 
(FAR, 2017). Industry is able to develop relationships and trust with particular ship agents 
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over a much greater time span than is the case with Navy husbanding practices. A ship’s 
agents must have a unique understanding of the port in which their principal’s ship is calling 
as well as close relationships with all businesses that will provide services for the ship 
(Cardona, 2011). Cardona, a member of the Association of Shipbrokers and Agents, 
emphasized the importance of the principal to ship agent relationship in a study conducted by 
a major global oil firm in 2011. The study demonstrated that shipping firms could receive an 
“annual savings of $5,000,000 if it could enjoy just a 30-minute reduction of the worldwide 
turnaround of vessels in port” (Cardona, 2011, p. 40). Industry ship’s agents also take their 
relationship with their principal (ship’s owner) further. They are responsible for not only 
husbanding, but for all business transactions conducted during each port call, such as 
unloading cargo, stevedoring and resolving any delays in offloading or loading cargo due to 
weather, equipment malfunctions, union issues, and so forth (Verrastro, 1996).  
A ship’s principals may advance up to 90% of the funds required to conduct business 
for a ship in a particular port. Before the port visit, they expect agents to provide the principal 
with an itemized list of projected expenses based on the agent’s knowledge of historical port 
costs. A ship’s agents are generally not liable for expenses incurred during a port visit, but 
they may voluntarily intervene in payment disputes between the principal and a service 
provider (Verrastro, 1996).  
In this section, industry’s use of husbanding service support was discussed, and key 
differences between Navy and industry use of HSPs were explained. The next section 
discusses findings from the Naval Audit Service related to shortcomings in the Navy’s 
husbanding and port services contracting processes. 
3. Naval Audit Service Findings: Navy Husbanding and Port Services 
Contracts 
Following the exposure of the Fat Leonard case, the Secretary of the Navy ordered an 
audit of the Navy’s husbanding processes. Later chapters will discuss details of the Fat 
Leonard case. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus ordered the Naval Audit Service to review 
these processes in December 2013 under the guidance set forth in SECNAV Instruction 
7510.7F, Department of the Navy Internal Audit. The audit’s purpose was to identify 
weaknesses in internal controls and propose ways to improve the overall husbanding process, 
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from identifying the port visit, soliciting proposals, awarding contracts, administering the 
contracts, and closing out the contracts. The audit focused on various port calls across several 
ship and submarine classes in both the 5th and 6th Fleets from 2012 to 2014 (Naval Audit 
Service, 2014).  
The audit results provided evidence for the Naval Audit Service to infer that the U.S. 
Navy’s contracting processes regarding husbanding were lacking in areas to deter and 
prevent fraud. Failures highlighted in the audit include (but are not limited to) failure by 
ship’s personnel to verify contractor charges for volumetric services, numbered fleets and 
administrative commanders not properly monitoring funds’ execution in various port calls, 
lack of segregation of duties in the ordering and receipt process, and ship’s supply officers 
not holding current contracting training or carrying insufficient training. Overall, the 
contracts that Naval Audit Service reviewed were valued at over $650 million (Naval Audit 
Service, 2014). The next paragraph will discuss several specific failures noted in the Naval 
Audit Service report.  
The audit team found that NAVSUP utilized a prohibited cost-plus-percentage-of-
cost contract in the United States Africa Command AOR. FAR 16.102 prohibits this type of 
contract, which FLC awarded without explicitly stating a ceiling on markups. The vendor in 
this case invoiced the Navy for more than $87,000 in markup fees over a two-year period of 
business (Naval Audit Service, 2014). 
The auditors noted deficiencies in the receipt and payment of volumetric services on 
multiple occasions. The majority of these instances involved a disconnect between the person 
signing invoices for these services (Collection, Holding, and Transfer [CHT]; potable water; 
etc.) and the ship’s supply officer who paid the bills. Another instance was the failure of 
sailors to verify invoiced amounts visually or with installed volumetric equipment (e.g., tank 
level indicators or engineering tank logs) and accepting contractor invoices at face value. 
Another volumetric failure involved a ship’s visit to the Kingdom of Bahrain. A contractor 
placed two 4,000-gallon liquid trucks on the pier next to the ship to empty its CHT tanks 
continually without having to wait for each individual truck to arrive. A third 4,000-gallon 
capacity truck arrived at intervals throughout the day to empty the other two trucks and 
dispose of the CHT. Auditors observed the single truck arrive and empty both stand-by 
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trucks that were visually not full. Even though the trucks were not full, and the receiving 
truck had only a 4,000-gallon capacity, ship’s company signed a receipt for disposing of 
8,000 gallons of waste. The receipt process in all instances lacked consistency and procedural 
compliance. All persons receiving material must circle the quantity, sign the document, and 
date the document per the NAVSUP P-485, Paragraph 6188 (Naval Audit Service, 2014). 
The ship’s force personnel involved in the audit could not produce all relevant receipt 
documents to match each purchase order DD 1155, and in one case, a sailor admitted that “if 
no one asks for the delivery tickets once the ship departs from port, he throws them away” 
(Naval Audit Service, 2014, p.13).  
A key component of the indictments in the Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA) case 
(details discussed later) is the mishandling and distribution of classified information. The 
Naval Audit Service observed that during the period of the audit (2012–2014), U.S. 5th and 
6th Fleets did not regard classified ships’ schedules as “need to know” information. All 
ship’s schedules were readily available to anyone who had a Secret clearance and a Secure 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR-Net) access. Various military personnel and 
contractors within each fleet could easily access this information although their job 
descriptions did not require them to know ships’ schedules (Naval Audit Service, 2014).  
Most relevant to this research, the auditors discovered several failures on the part of 
NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center (FLC) Sigonella in the awarding and administering of port 
visit contracts. The audit revealed that FLC Sigonella had designated FLC Sigonella 
personnel as contracting officer’s representatives (CORs) on numerous occasions, despite 
DOD contracting policy dictating that the COR be a person of the requiring command (the 
customer). The FLC Sigonella CORs did not travel to each port visit to determine whether 
the contractor performed the services. Similarly, FLC Sigonella failed to enforce Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) in two of the five contracts they awarded during the 
audit’s timeframe. The auditors found the remaining three contracts to contain deficient 
QASPS, with no requirement for accuracy in volumetric services, no prohibition of markups 
for unpriced “emergent” customer requirements, and no requirement for the service provider 
to verify they actually possessed the capacity and capability to carry out the contract. 
Furthermore, neither the FLC Sigonella contracting office nor the ship maintained a complete 
contract administration file as required by the FAR 4.8. Specifically, FLC contracting files 
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were missing several DD 1155 order documents in all 12 contracting files that were sampled 
(Naval Audit Service, 2014).  
Naval Audit Service ended its report with an unfavorable evaluation of the ability of 
U.S. Fleet Forces Command (and its components) and NAVSUP to reassure Navy leadership 
and the American taxpayers that they had sufficient internal control practices in place to deter 
and prevent fraud in Navy husbanding contracts. The auditors mentioned three specific areas 
where the Navy was lacking, which included “effectiveness and efficiency of operations, 
including the use of the entity’s resources, reliability of financial reporting, and compliance 
with applicable laws and regulations” (Naval Audit Service, 2014, p. 18).  
This section discussed findings from the Naval Audit Service related to shortcomings 
in the Navy’s husbanding and port services contracting process. The next section discusses 
the current husbanding process employed by the Navy and changes made to account for the 
shortcomings highlighted by the Naval Audit Service in its September 2014 report and based 
on lessons learned from the GDMA case. 
4. Husbanding of the Future: Off-Ship Bill Pay 
During the Naval Audit Service’s audit of Navy husbanding processes, the Chief of 
Naval Operations concurrently ordered that the Navy conduct research on alternative 
methods to procure husbanding services that were both measurable and auditable. 
Subsequently, NAVSUP rescinded afloat supply officer authority to negotiate contract terms 
and conditions, establish contract line item pricing, or place orders for any line item not 
specifically priced under existing contract vehicles (NAVSUP, 2014). The Naval Audit 
Service’s results further reinforced the Secretary of the Navy’s position that the process must 
change. He created a Task Force Navy Operational Commanders Support (TF NOCS) to 
explore the process improvement of Navy HSP contracting. Rear Admiral Grafton Chase led 
TF NOCS while he served as Reserve Director, Logistics and Business Operations in the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The task force incorporated elements of myriad 
Navy commands, including the Undersecretary of the Navy for Financial Management and 
Comptroller, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), United States Fleet Forces 
Command (USFF), United States Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), NAVSUP, and Defense Finance 
and Accounting Service (DFAS), to name a few. Their purpose was to develop a 
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standardized process that could cover all husbanding needs across every ship and submarine 
class in the Navy inventory. This task force aimed to ensure the new process was auditable, 
contractually sound, and eliminated the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (Murphy & Gardner, 
SC Newsletter, 2015). A key task of TF NOCS was to cultivate a culture of port visit 
accountability between every ship commanding officer and his crew. Historically, the 
relationship between the supply officer and the HSP was the foundation of the port visit 
process (Braun, 2015).  
TF NOCS provided a product in 2014 called Off-Ship Bill Pay (OSBP). The new 
process went into effect Navy-wide on October 1, 2015. Prior to OSBP coming online, all 
Navy type commanders provided ship-specific training to all commanding officers, 
command master chiefs, supply officers, and their departments on the new process, stressing 
ethics laws and regulations regarding interaction with contractor personnel. The CNO also 
declared the husbanding process to be “Commanders’ business” meaning the commanding 
officer, executive officer, command master chief, and other leaders all hold an equal stake in 
a successful port visit. No longer does the responsibility and accountability of the port visit 
fall to the supply officer alone. U.S. Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet along with 
5th, 6th, and 7th Fleet staffs also conducted proof-of-concept “test” OSBP port visits during the 
early part of 2015 using each ship class in the Navy.  
The OSBP process begins similarly to that of the process employed prior to the Fat 
Leonard case, with a ship identifying a requirement to conduct a port call (upon approval of 
numbered fleet commander). Instead of developing their own LOGREQ, ships are required to 
utilize standardized LOGREQs according to their ship class and required type of visit 
(moored or anchored). The standardized LOGREQ was developed by the TF NOCS and 
includes class-specific information that is required for port calls, such as required number of 
tugboats, dimensions of the ship, required mooring line information, required type, and 
dimension of fenders (if pier-side mooring), etc. 
OSBP requires that ships submit a standardized LOGREQ (Unclassified) to their 
numbered fleet commander for approval no later than 30 days prior to a scheduled port visit. 
TF NOCS provided every numbered fleet with trained contracting officer’s representatives 
(CORs) that monitor the administration of husbanding contracts in their specific AOR. The 
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COR reviews the LOGREQ to verify the ship’s requirements and identifies any deviations 
from the pre-filled numerical values listed for all services. All deviations from the standard 
LOGREQ require approval from the numbered fleet commander before the next step. After 
the COR approves the LOGREQ, they forward it to the Fleet Logistics Center servicing the 
AOR, who will issue a Request for Proposal (RFP). After the FLC awards a task order, or a 
stand-alone contract in the case where an IDIQ contract instrument does not exist, the ship 
will receive a copy of the task order, or stand-alone contract if applicable, along with an 
itemized spreadsheet to verify and document daily invoices with the HSP throughout the 
duration of their port visit.  
During the port visit, the ship acts as receiving agent, completes the port visit 
checklist, and rectifies all daily business with the HSP. If the ship has an emergent 
requirement, it must coordinate services through the assigned COR who is available 24/7. 
OSBP does allow leeway in the event that the safety of the ship or ship’s personnel is at risk. 
A hypothetical example of this would be where a ship required an additional tugboat during 
arrival due to high winds that could present a safety situation. For these requirements, 
commanding officers and supply officers have the authority to order directly from the HSP 
and rectify all documents after the fact with the COR. At the conclusion of the port call, the 
ship meets with the HSP to gather all final invoices and receipts. The ship’s supply officer 
compiles a single DD Form 250 Material Receiving and Inspection Report to document all 
services and quantities provided by the HSP. The supply officer is required to submit the DD 
Form 250 and completed port visit checklist to the COR within three days of leaving port. 
Under the process employed prior to the Fat Leonard case, disbursing officers assigned to the 
ship were required to pay the HSP with a treasury check or cash for services rendered, but 
with Off-Ship Bill Pay, this function falls to commands ashore. When the COR receives the 
signed DD Form 250 and port visit checklist, he or she verifies this against the final invoices 
that the HSP submits and the FLC task order. This provides an auditable, 3-way match. In the 
case of discrepancies between the DD Form 250, the FLC Task Order/Contract, and HSP 
invoices, the COR will work with the responsible parties to achieve resolution. When the 
COR has a certified, three-way match, they forward the documents to the ship’s TYCOM, 
who certifies the bill and submits the package within approximately 30 days to DFAS for 
payment. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of this process.  
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Figure 1.  Husbanding Provider/Off-Ship Bill Pay Process Map.  
Source: Commander, Naval Air Forces (2017). 
This section discussed the husbanding process currently employed by the Navy and 
changes made to the former process to account for the shortcomings highlighted by the Naval 
Audit Service. The next section discusses another initiative taken by the Navy to reform the 
Navy HSP contracting process—multiple award contracts. 
5. Multiple Award Contracts 
In an effort to increase competition and transparency in pricing, NAVSUP developed 
a strategy of utilizing Multiple Award Contracts (MAC), a form of an IDIQ contract 
instrument, in specific ports, countries, and regions inhabited by the Navy. Under this 
strategy, an FLC may decide to establish a MAC in a specific port (Brugler, 2016). In this 
case, a ship’s port visit would be competed against the MAC schedule holders and award 
made to the contractor determined by the Contracting Officer to have best met the source 
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selection criteria. In 2016, Fleet Logistics Center Yokosuka awarded the first Multiple Award 
Contract (MAC) to four husbanding service providers for services in upcoming port visits to 
Hong Kong. The period of performance was from September 1, 2016, to August 31, 2017, 
with a six-month option. This type of procurement strategy allows FLC Yokosuka to have 
capable HSPs ready to support existing ship visits and allows for more flexibility over 
awarding individual stand-alone contracts in the event that 7th Fleet adds more port visits 
during the period of performance (Laron, 2016). A review of the publicly accessible 
Government Point of Entry (GPE) website (http://fbo.gov), conducted on August 8, 2017, 
shows that the Navy has solicited long-term HSP MAC IDIQ contracts for ports of call in 
Japan, South Korea, Russia, the Republic of the Philippines, and Europe.  
This section discussed Navy HSP contracting processes as well as Naval Audit 
Service findings on the deficiencies of the process. The Naval Audit Service identified 
weaknesses in stakeholder competency, HSP contract management processes, and internal 
controls. Competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal controls are 
components that characterize an organization’s degree of auditability (Rendon & Rendon, 
2015). The next section discusses auditability theory. 
C. AUDITABILITY THEORY 
Power espouses in his book Organized Uncertainty that “making objects auditable 
places them within a particular style or climate of proof and reasoning” (Power, 2007a, 
p. 152). Power (2007) states, “A theory of auditability requires a much wider field of vision 
than audit alone because it delineates a distinctive managerial and governmental 
epistemology by which organizational practices can be publicly known to both their 
participants and by distant others” (Power, 2007a, p. 162). By “making things auditable,” 
organizations can provide the transparency and assurance that they are operating ethically 
and within the accepted guidelines (Power, 1996, p. 289). Power argues that organizations 
must manage risk by establishing processes and procedures that allow for their auditability 
(Power, 2007a). 
Rendon and Rendon (2015) argue that “the theory of auditability incorporates three 
aspects of governance which emphasizes effective internal controls, capable processes, and 
competent personnel” (p. 715). The relationship between these components is depicted in 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Auditability Triangle. Source: Rendon & Rendon (2015). 
Auditability theory can be applied to public procurement organizations. The United 
Nations Office on Drug and Crime states that a public procurement system must be open and 
transparent, invoke procedures that are open to scrutiny, and contain a system of internal 
controls (United Nations, 2016). Rendon & Rendon (2015) state that a procurement 
organization can reduce its vulnerability to procurement fraud by emphasizing the 
competency of procurement personnel, the capability of the organization’s contact 
management processes, and the effectiveness of the organization’s internal controls. They 
apply these concepts to the context of the contract management environment within the 
DOD. The next section will discuss the first component of auditability, competent personnel. 
1. Competent Personnel 
Rendon and Rendon (2016) state that “the competent personnel component refers to 
the education, training and experience of the DOD contracting officers performing 
contracting management activities” (p. 754). The DOD mandates minimal educational and 
experience requirements that must be attained by all members of the acquisition workforce 
(Snider, 1996). However, despite these certification requirements, previous research reveals 
deficiencies in the DOD’s contracting workforce to detect procurement fraud. A 2006 report 
by the GAO warned that the DOD faced vulnerability to procurement fraud due to the 
capability gaps within the acquisition workforce (GAO, 2006). In 2015, the GAO once again 
implored the DOD to take action to improve the competency of its acquisition workforce 
(GAO, 2015).  
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Chang’s 2013 survey of a U.S. Army contracting organization revealed significant 
gaps in the understanding of procurement fraud by military and civilian contracting officials 
(Chang, 2013). Castillo and Flanagan (2014) conducted the same research survey against a 
U.S. Air Force contracting organization in 2014 and found similarly poor results. Grennan 
and McCrory’s 2016 survey of a U.S. Navy contracting organization using the same survey 
instrument “identified that there is a significant discrepancy in the ability of the contracting 
professionals to detect procurement fraud” (Grennan & McCrory, 2016, p. 57). These 
research studies showed that DOD contracting officers possessed a low level of knowledge 
pertaining to procurement fraud schemes and internal controls. The studies also revealed that 
these contracting officers perceived that their organizations were not vulnerable to 
procurement fraud. Next, the second component of auditability, capable processes, will be 
discussed. 
2. Capable Processes 
Hong and Kwon (2012) argue that “maximum value through procurement requires 
effective coordination of sourcing, purchasing, or distribution from the immediate suppliers 
or logistics service providers” (p. 463). This implies robust processes must be established to 
achieve this value. Rendon and Rendon (2016) state that “the capable process component of 
auditability refers to DOD contract management processes and related contract management 
activities performed by the contracting workforce” (p. 754). Garrett and Rendon (2005) 
identify a framework that categorizes the life cycle of a contracting action into six phases, 
characterized into six distinct phases, each with a variety of activities that must be completed 
before the contract action can transition into the subsequent phase. Garrett and Rendon 
(2005) state these phases can be viewed from both the buying and selling perspectives. 
Specifically, from the buyer’s standpoint, these phases include “procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and contract 
closeout” (Garrett, 2007, p. 21). Separate phases make up the seller’s process and these 
phases correspond directly to each phase in the buyer’s process (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
These phases consist of “pre-sales activity, bid/no bid decision-making, bid or proposal 
preparation, contract negotiation and formation, contract administration, and contract 
closeout” (Garrett, 2007, p. 22). Capable contract management processes must be established 
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within each phase to ensure compliance with organization objectives and to deter 
procurement fraud (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). Past research of the Navy’s contract 
management process capability identified that the solicitation, contract administration, and 
contract closeout processes had lower levels of capability than the procurement planning, 
solicitation planning, and source selection processes (Rendon, 2015). The contract 
management framework will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. Next, the third and 
final component of auditability, effective internal controls, will be discussed.  
3. Effective Internal Controls 
Power (2007a) states that, “To lack internal controls, or for such controls to be judged 
as ‘materially’ weak, is to fail as a legitimate organization—something only mitigated by 
early voluntary disclosure of such weakness” (p. 161). Effective internal controls ensure 
“compliance with laws and regulations, monitoring procedures to assess enforcement, and 
reporting material weaknesses” (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 715). In a 1999 report, the 
GAO found that, “Management should track major agency achievements and compare these 
plans to goals and objectives” (p. 13). This can only be accomplished through documentation 
and establishment of verification procedures (GAO, 1999). The Committee on Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission established an integrated internal 
control framework that establishes five components of internal controls. When integrated, 
these components provide the groundwork for an effective internal control system (COSO, 
2013). The Internal Control Integrated Framework will be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. This section discussed auditability theory and the components of the auditability 
triangle. In the next section, the contract management framework is discussed. 
D. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The Contract Management Body of Knowledge asserts that contract management is 
the means of systematically and efficiently overseeing the contract creation, execution, and 
completion in three main phases (NCMA, 2017). The National Contract Management 
Association identifies these phases as pre-award, award, and post-award (NCMA, 2017). 
These phases are further divided into “six major steps for the buyer and six major activities 
for the seller” (Garrett, 2007, p. 19). The contract management framework uses phases to 
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describe all contracting actions and the underlying activities that occur within a contract’s 
life cycle (Rendon, 2008). Proper execution of each phase affects the ultimate success of the 
contract and contractor performance (Rendon, 2008). There are several different names for 
each activity and steps. The differences encompass the same events. Each of the steps and 
activities can be seen in Figure 3 and will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
Figure 3.  Buyer’s and Seller’s Contract Management Process. 
Source: Garrett (2007). 
 
1. Six Contract Management Phases—Buyer’s Side 
Garrett (2007) asserts that, “The major phases for the buyer are procurement 
planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and 
contract closeout or termination” (p. 19). Figure 4 shows each of the buyer’s steps, along 
with some of the inputs, tools used, and the outputs created along the progression. 
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Figure 4.  Buyer’s Contract Management Process. Source: Garrett (2007). 
a. Procurement Planning 
The buyer’s contract management process starts with procurement planning. Garrett 
(2007) states that the procurement process “involves determining whether to procure, how to 
procure, what to procure, how much to procure, and when to procure” (p. 81). Activities 
within this phase include determining the requirement, describing the product for acquisition, 
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and performing market research to ascertain the marketplace capability (Garrett, 2011). Other 
activities include “determining funds availability, developing initial cost and schedule 
estimates as well as manpower resources” (Garrett, 2011, p. 208).  
In Navy husbanding, the buyer’s procurement planning phase occurs prior to the 
decision-making authority creating ships’ port visit schedules. This involves the numbered 
Fleet Commander working with the applicable embassy to schedule port visits based on State 
Department and Department of Defense (DOD) desires, host country availability, and timing 
considerations. Procurement planning consists of the appropriate personnel planning the 
basic requirements of a ship visit. It involves market research to ascertain the services 
available at the individual ports being considered to ensure potential ports of call are capable 
of supporting a navy vessel. Procurement planning also includes developing an overarching 
acquisition strategy to support port calls throughout a particular region or area of 
responsibility.  
b. Solicitation Planning 
Solicitation planning is the next phase in the buyer’s process. This step builds upon 
the outputs of procurement planning and utilizes them to prepare the documents needed to 
support the solicitation. Rendon (2008) states that the activities within the solicitation 
planning phase include finalizing the description of the procurement requirement, 
determining the procurement method and contract type, developing solicitation documents, 
formulating the source selection criteria, and defining contract terms and conditions. The 
decisions made for each of these activities will be used in subsequent phases of the contract 
management process. 
In Navy husbanding, the buyer’s solicitation planning phase begins after the decision-
making authority releases the port schedules for the ships in the local area of responsibility. 
In the case of an individual port visit, solicitation planning is initiated upon the ship’s 
submission of a LOGREQ. The procurement organization receives the LOGREQ, reviews 
the requirements, and determines the best contracting vehicles to employ to achieve the 
requirements. To support an overall acquisition strategy for a particular region or area of 
responsibility, solicitation planning involves determining the best way to support ongoing 
and recurrent requirements, such as an IDIQ contract instrument and the appropriate task 
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order contract type (e.g., firm-fixed price) to achieve the desired objectives. Solicitation 
planning also includes developing the proposal evaluation criteria and developing a source 
selection plan by which the husbanding offerors would be evaluated. 
c. Solicitation 
Solicitation is the process of publicizing procurement requirements to potential sellers 
(Garrett, 2007). Solicitations should communicate the buyer’s needs to potential sellers in 
unambiguous terms (Garrett, 2011). Prospective contractors should “have a clear, common 
understanding of the technical and contractual requirements of the acquisition” (Garrett, 
2011, p. 209). When the buyer provides higher quality solicitations, the seller typically 
produces higher quality bids and proposals (Garrett, 2007). Events that occur during the 
solicitation include advertising the proposal opportunity, hosting bidders or pre-proposal 
conferences, and receiving the offerors proposals (Rendon & Rendon, 2016). Bidders or pre-
proposal conferences allow prospective offerors to resolve any questions regarding proposal 
or contract requirements (Garrett, 2007). Rendon (2008) writes that the “Federal government 
contracting opportunities are publicized through the Government Point of Entry” (GPE) (p. 
173). FAR 2.101 defines GPE as “the single point where government business opportunities 
can be accessed electronically by the public through the Federal Business Opportunities 
(FEDBIZOPS) website (https://www.fbo.gov)” (FAR, 2017). Solicitation process can also 
yield a list of qualified bidders that can be used to potentially support future procurements 
(Rendon, 2008). The goal of the solicitation phase is to select the best source that meets the 
buyer’s needs by receiving competitive proposals that can be assessed using the source 
selection criteria established in the solicitation planning phase (Baker, Bono, & DeVoe, 
2016). 
In Navy husbanding, the buyer’s solicitation phase consists of the issuance of a 
request for proposal that contains the requirements set forth in the ship’s LOGREQ and the 
receipt of offers. In the case where a long-term contract for a particular region or country is 
solicited, the husbanding contracting office might convene a pre-proposal conference to 
address technical and contractual requirements to all interested offerors. 
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d. Source Selection 
Source selection is the process of taking the proposals submitted and applying the 
evaluation criteria previously established (Garrett, 2007). Furthermore, negotiating with 
suppliers, if applicable, and executing the contract award strategy will occur during source 
selection (Rendon, 2008). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that “the vision 
of the Federal Acquisition System is to deliver on a timely basis the best value product or 
service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy 
objectives” (FAR, 2017, 1.102).  
An organization can use several competitive source selection approaches to provide 
the best value. The organization can choose to select the offeror with the lowest price 
technically acceptable (LPTA) proposal, the highest technically rated offeror (HTRO), or use 
a trade-off process (FAR, 2017). FAR 15.101-1 states that “the LPTA source selection 
process is appropriate when the best value is expected to come from a selection of the 
technically acceptable proposal with the lowest price” (FAR, 2017). FAR 15.101-1 further 
details that a tradeoff process is “appropriate when it may be in the best interest of the 
Government to consider award to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than the 
highest technically rated offeror” (FAR, 2017, 15.101-1). The source selection method that is 
intended to be used shall be stated in the solicitation. Moreover, FAR 15.101-1 states that 
(1) All evaluation factors and significant subfactors that will affect contract 
award and their relative importance shall be clearly stated in the solicitation; 
and (2) The solicitation shall state whether all evaluation factors other than 
cost or price, when combined, are significantly more important than, 
approximately equal to, or significantly less important than cost or price 
(FAR, 2017).  
The complexity of the proposal will determine if one person or board of people will 
evaluate the sources and select the best alternative (Garrett, 2007). Factors such as 
procurement method and dollar value of the acquisition determine the complexity of the 
source selection process (Cibnic, Nash, & Yukins, 2011). Complex source selection 
processes require the establishment of “a formal selection organization to manage the source 
selection process” (Rendon, 2008, p. 175) This organization includes “the source selection 
authority, source selection advisory council, source selection evaluation team, and the 
contracting officer” (Rendon, 2008 p. 175). The source selection evaluation team includes 
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relevant representation from “contracting, legal, logistics, technical, and other field of 
expertise” (Rendon, 2008 p. 175), to ensure that each functional aspect of the proposal is 
evaluated thoroughly. Accordingly, the source selection evaluation team should be planned 
and established during the procurement planning process (Rendon, 2008).  
Negotiations allow the communication between buyer and seller to clarify all portions 
of the proposal and its terms. Negotiations frequently include clarification of requirements 
and requests from sellers to change or consider alternate ways while maintaining the 
requirements of the solicitation. The buyer’s goal is to work out the type of contract along 
with the overall price that will best encourage the seller to render cost-effective and efficient 
performance (FAR, 2017). FAR 15.405 further asserts that “the negotiation of a contract type 
and price are related and should be considered together with the issues of risk and uncertainty 
to the seller and the buyer” (FAR, 2017).  
FAR 15.402 mandates that prior to forming a contract, contracting officers must 
determine sellers to be responsible and deem the proposed purchase price to be fair and 
reasonable (FAR, 2017). Specifically, the contracting officer “should balance the contract 
type, cost, and profit/fee negotiated to attain the outcome of fair and reasonable prices to 
achieve a total result and price that is fair and reasonable to both the Government and the 
contractor” (FAR, 2017, 15.405). Techniques such as price analysis, cost analysis, and cost 
realism analysis should be employed to reach a fair and reasonable price determination 
(FAR, 2017). A fair price to the buyer is one found on the open market given the similar 
circumstances for comparable products, grade, and amount needed (Contract Pricing 
Reference Guide [CPRG], 2017). A realistic price that allows the seller to perform in 
accordance with the contract is considered to be a fair price to the seller (CPRG, 2017). 
CPRG Vol. I defines a reasonable price as “a price that a prudent and competent buyer would 
be willing to pay given available data on: market conditions; including supply and demand, 
general economic conditions, and competition” (CPRG, 2017).  
Debriefings provided to unsuccessful offerors constitute the final step in the source 
selection process (Rumbaugh, 2010). The two types of debriefings are categorized by when 
they are conducted. Pre-award debriefings occur prior to contract award when the buyer has 
determined that the offeror’s proposal lacks the crucial factors needed to remain in 
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competition for the contract award (FAR, 2017). Post-award debriefings occur after the 
contract is awarded and consist of the buyer’s explaining their evaluation of the applicable 
substantial weaknesses in the offeror’s proposal (FAR, 2017). According to FAR (2017), 
each unsuccessful offeror is entitled to one debriefing.  
In Navy husbanding, the source selection phase occurs after the contracting officer 
receives offers from HSPs. Source selection officials will review and evaluate the offer in 
accordance with the source selection plan developed in the solicitation planning phase, and 
the contracting officer will make award to an offeror based on the defined source selection 
methodology. 
e. Contract Administration 
Contract administration is the management of all actions, after the award of a contract 
until the closeout or termination, to ensure that the buyer and seller are meeting the contract 
requirements. It begins when the contract is awarded and ends when all work is delivered, 
completed, and accepted (Martin & Miller, 2006). Garret (2007) states that the primary 
contract administration actions are monitoring of compliance with terms and conditions, 
applying useful communication and control, managing contract changes, invoicing and 
payment, and settling claims and disputes. The principle objectives for contract 
administration are the same for the buyer and seller (Garrett, 2007).  
During a post-award orientation, the buyer and seller identify possible difficulties in 
contract performance and develop viable solutions to achieve contract success (FAR, 2017). 
The post-award/pre-performance conference should start before the performance of the 
contract begins. At this conference, the buyer and seller should identify key personnel to be 
the voice for each organization and confirm their roles and responsibilities (Garrett, 2007; 
Rendon, 2008).  
An important aspect of the contract administration phase for the buyer is to monitor 
the performance of the seller. According to Rendon (2008), depending upon the contract type 
and complexity of the item or service being procured, the buyer “may use technical 
representatives such as quality assurance evaluators (QAEs), quality assurance 
representatives (QARs), or contracting officer technical representatives (COTRs) to perform 
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the technical aspects of monitoring the seller’s performance” (p 177). These personnel can 
assist in determining if technical documentation and/or technical requirements require 
revision or correction (Rendon, 2008).  
After the contract is awarded, changes may need to occur to resolve any issues that 
were unknown at the time of award. A key function of contract administration activities is 
focused on managing changes in the contract. It is critical to the contract that the buyer and 
seller maintain an official, efficient, and systematic process for managing contract changes 
(Rendon, 2008). Contract modifications and formal documentation should be used to make 
any changes to a contract. This process allows all pertinent personnel, on the buyer’s and 
seller’s side, to be cognizant of the changes to allow for the planning and implementation. A 
changes clause, required in many contracts, allows the buyer to direct the seller to make 
certain changes known as “change orders.” However, these changes must be within the scope 
of the contract (Rendon, 2009). Any proposed changes that are outside the scope of the 
contract are not allowed under the change clause and could be considered a breach of 
contract. These proposed changes must be executed through a new procurement action 
(Rendon, 2008). 
Managing the payment process to the seller is another important part of contract 
administration. The contract type and period of performance will determine the method of 
payment to the seller (Rendon, 2008). The types of payment made against government 
contracts consistent predominately of “payment of the contract price for completed items of 
work, progress payments based on costs incurred or a percentage of completion of work, and 
payments based on the performance of the work” (Cibinic, Nash, & Nagle, 2006, p. 1125).  
In Navy husbanding, the buyer’s contract administration phase occurs after the 
contract is awarded. It involves oversight to ensure the HSP provides the required goods and 
services in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contracts. Additionally, contract 
administration involves the issuance of contract modifications if changes to the original 
contract are required. For example, the original contract might call for the HSP to furnish two 
chartered buses for use by the ship during the port visit. After the start of the port visit, the 
ship realizes that it actually requires three buses. The contracting officer would have to issue 
a contract modification to authorize the HSP to provide the additional bus. 
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f. Contract Closeout and Termination 
Contract administration ends and contract closeout begins after the evidence of its 
physical completion has been received by the contract administration office and verification 
of the performance completion (Garrett, 2009). FAR 4.804-4 states that the physical 
completion of a contract occurs after the necessary supplies have been delivered or the 
requisite services have been performed by the seller. Completion also occurs after acceptance 
by the buyer, after the expiration of all applicable option provisions, or after the 
“Government has given the seller a notice of complete contract termination” (FAR, 2017, 
FAR 4.804-4). A contract can end via successful performance, termination for default, or 
termination for convenience (Garrett, 2007). The contracting officer initiates the contract 
closeout process upon receiving the notification from the administrative contracting officer 
(ACO). A contract closeout checklist is used to ensure all required actions have been 
properly completed (FAR, 2017). 
In Navy husbanding, the buyer’s closeout phase occurs after contract performance. In 
the case of closeout, the ship’s personnel must verify that the HSP provided services and 
goods in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. Prior to paying the 
contractor, the government would ensure an appropriate individual certified the contractor’s 
invoices. The termination phase, however, could occur before contract performance. In 
termination, the government may exercise its unilateral right to terminate for convenience or 
terminate for default if necessary.  
2. Six Contract Management Phases—Seller’s Side 
The seller’s phases include “pre-sales activity, bid or no bid decision-making, bid or 
proposal preparation, contract negotiation and formation, contract administration, and 
contract closeout or termination” (Garrett, 2007, p. 22). Figure 5 shows each of the seller’s 
steps, along with some of the inputs, tools used, and the outputs created through the sequence 
of events. 
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Figure 5.  Seller’s Contract Management Process. Source: Garrett (2007). 
a. Pre-Sales Activity 
Garrett (2007) states that “pre-sales activity is the proactive involvement of the seller 
with prospective and current buyers” (p. 25). Garrett (2007) points out that pre-sales 
activities aid in identifying business opportunities, identifying customer needs, and 
determining ways to maintain, achieve, or enhance a seller’s competitive advantage. To 
remain competitive and relevant, the seller must be aware of changes in the market, 
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cognizant of evolving technologies, and changes in customer needs as it relates to the seller’s 
product/service mix (Garrett, 2007).  
In Navy husbanding, the seller’s pre-sales activity phase involves an HSP marketing 
itself to the Navy. Examples would include sales presentation, demonstrations of activity, 
acquisition of assets and enterprises to support potential business activity, development of 
business strategy, and other techniques designed to increase the husbanding services 
opportunity to receive a husbanding contract. 
b. Bid or No Bid Decision-Making 
The bid or no bid decision-making process begins after the buyer has completed the 
solicitation phase and issued its solicitation. The seller then analyzes the buyer’s solicitation, 
evaluates the competitive environment, and conducts an assessment of the opportunities 
versus the risks associated with the potential contract (Garrett, 2007). The seller then must 
make the decision on whether or not to prepare a bid for the solicitation (Garrett, 2007).  
In Navy husbanding, the bid or no bid decision-making phase involves an HSP 
reviewing the government’s request for proposal for a particular port visit, or request 
proposal for a long-term contract, to determine if they are in a position to actually submit an 
offer. Considerations include cost structure, subcontractor requirements, technical expertise, 
past performance and experience, potential profit, and source selection factors. 
c. Bid or Proposal Preparation 
Once the seller makes the decision to prepare a bid in response to the solicitation, he 
or she enters the bid or proposal preparation phase. Bid or proposal preparation is the process 
of forming a bid or proposal in response to the buyer’s solicitation (Garrett, 2007). The size 
and complexity of the bid or proposal is dependent upon the complexity of the buyer’s needs. 
Similarly, the complexity drives the unit size that will write and create the bid or proposal 
(Garrett, 2007). The bid or proposal preparation phase must be handled effectively in order to 
achieve its goals. Preparation endeavors must be organized, planned, executed, and 
structured. Before submitting the bid or proposal to the buyer, staff outside of the preparation 
team must independently assess the final draft to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
customer and the requirements of the solicitation (Garrett, 2007). 
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In Navy husbanding, bid or proposal preparation involves crafting an offer that is 
responsive to the government request for proposal. Considerations include cost structure, 
subcontractor requirements, technical expertise, past performance and experience, potential 
profit, and source selection factors. 
d. Contract Negotiation and Formation 
The bid or proposal that presents best value to the buyer will enter the next phase of 
contract negotiation and formation. As previously stated regarding the buyer’s negotiation 
activities described, it is ideal for the seller to create shared expectations and interpretations 
to reach a common ground of agreement with the buyer (Garrett, 2007). The end result of this 
phase could be a contract with the buyer. However, if the seller and buyer cannot come to an 
agreement on the terms and conditions, walking away from the deal may be the best course 
of action for the seller (Garrett, 2007). In Navy husbanding, the contract negotiation and 
formation phase involves the HSP negotiating with the Navy to establish a contract to 
support a port visit.  
e. Contract Administration 
Upon reaching a mutual agreement and the contract being awarded to the seller, both 
parties enter the contract administration phase. This phase encompasses the combined seller 
and buyer activities borne to successfully perform and administer the contract (Garrett, 
2009). The seller’s actions are nearly identical to the buyer’s actions as previously described 
in the buyer’s contract administration phase.  
In Navy husbanding, the HSP contract administration phase involves the HSP 
complying with the contract and proceeding with changes required by the government. For 
example, if the original contract calls for the HSP to furnish two chartered buses for use by 
the ship during port visit, and after the start of the port visit, the ship realizes that it actually 
requires three buses, the HSP would submit to the contracting officer a proposal to include 
the cost of furnishing a third bus. The HSP requires authority from the contracting officer 
before providing the third bus. 
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f. Contract Closeout and Termination 
Along with contract administration, the seller’s contract closeout and termination 
actions parallel the buyer’s as described previously in the buyer’s contract closeout and 
termination phase (Garrett, 2007). However, in government contracting, only the buyer (the 
government) can terminate the contract for convenience due to the government’s right as a 
sovereign entity. In Navy husbanding, the HSP contract closeout phase would involve the 
HSP providing the government with invoices and evidence that the contractor fulfilled the 
terms and conditions of the contract. Termination is a unilateral act by the government in 
either its role as a sovereign or a contracted party. As discussed in the previous sections, 
during a review of the Navy’s HSP process, the Naval Audit Service identified deficiencies 
in the HSP processes. These deficiencies were related to husbanding contract management 
processes, internal controls, and the competency of process stakeholders. Capable processes, 
internal controls, and competent personnel are components that characterize an 
organization’s degree of auditability (Rendon & Rendon, 2016). If an organization does not 
have sound contract management processes, effective internal controls, and competent 
personnel, the organization is vulnerable to procurement fraud (Rendon & Rendon, 2016). 
The next section will discuss the Internal Control Integrated Framework. 
E. INTERNAL CONTROL INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 
Following the major failures of several well-publicized municipal, private, and public 
corporations due to financial irregularities in the early and mid-1980s, the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting was established in June 1985 (SEC, 1989). 
The Commission was a private-sector initiative, jointly sponsored and funded by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the American Accounting Association 
(AAA), the Financial Executives Institute (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the 
National Association of Accountants (NAA) [now the Institute of Management Accountants 
(IMA)] (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Accounting Report, 1987; COSO, 
2013). Today, these organizations are collectively known as the Committee on Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO) (COSO, 2013). The commission, formed in 1987, was charged with 
examining the causes of the failures and seeking ways that audit practices could be reviewed 
and modified to prevent future occurrences. It became known as the Treadway Commission 
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due to its chairman, James C. Treadway, Jr., a former Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) chairman (SEC, 1989). The Commission’s 1987 report expounded that the prevention 
and detection of fraudulent activity within a public company must be addressed by focusing 
on the: 
(1) The tone set by top management, (2) the internal accounting and audit 
function, (3) the audit committee, (4) management and audit committee 
reports, (5) the practice of seeking second opinions from independent public 
accountants, and (6) quarterly reporting (National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Accounting Report, 1987, p. 3).  
The Commission also made recommendations regarding independent auditor standards and 
business practices, and it offered recommendations to the SEC regarding needed changes to 
regulatory frameworks (SEC, 1989).  
Following the 1987 report, the commission continued efforts to develop an Internal 
Control Integrated Framework and developed the first version in 1992. The framework 
introduced five internal control components that “work in tandem to mitigate the risks of an 
organization’s failure to achieve its objectives” (COSO, 2009, p. 1). The framework was 
most recently updated in 2013 and streamlines the original framework developed in 1992, 
accounting for changes in markets, business environments, and regulatory requirements 
(McNally, 2013). The next section will discuss the five components of the Internal Control 
Integrated Framework. 
1. Five Components 
The five components of the Committee on Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) internal 
control framework consist of “control environment, risk assessment, control activities, 
information and communication, and monitoring activities” (COSO, 2013, p. 6). The GAO 
initially adopted these five components in 1999 and in 2014 issued an update to reflect the 
COSO 2013 updates (GAO, 2014). Each of the five components is depicted in Figure 6. 
These components are explained in depth in the next section. 
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Figure 6.  Relationship of Objectives and Components. Source: COSO (2013). 
a. Control Environment 
“The tone set by top management” (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Accounting Report, 1987, p. 3), influences the corporate environment and is of overriding 
importance in preventing fraud within an organization. COSO (2013) defines control 
environment as “the standards, processes, and structures that provide the basis for carrying 
out internal control across the organization” (p. 4). Ethical behavior, employee competence, 
and organization are the key factors that dictate the control environment, and accordingly, 
management must set the example and display integrity and ethical behavior (GAO, 1999). 
Management must demonstrate commitment to accountability by developing and employing 
meaningful measures to assess performance (Tan, 2013). Additionally, management must 
create incentives and rewards that motivate and stimulate desired employee performance 
(Tan, 2013). An organizational structure that emphasizes effective communication flow, 
creates appropriate reporting relationships with management oversights, and gives employees 
the right degree of management centralization is also required to fulfill this component 
(GAO, 2001).  
In a 2009 study, Basheka (2009) surveyed 548 public procurement stakeholders in 
Uganda and found a major form of procurement fraud to be the abuse of power by high 
ranking public officials. Survey respondents alleged that these officials abused their 
government positions to improperly influence procurement decisions (Basheka, 2009). By 
setting an unethical tone, these officials engendered a culture of corruption within their 
organizations. 
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A Navy husbanding procurement organization could be vulnerable to fraud given a 
weak control environment. A hypothetical example of fraud vulnerability would be a 
contracting organization tasked with executing husbanding service contracts, where the 
leadership of that organization failed to stress integrity and ethical behavior across all phases 
of the husbanding contract management process and lacked the processes in place to drive 
competence and accountability. This leadership vacuum within the husbanding contracting 
organization would likely lead to the breakdown of managerial oversight and lead to 
procurement fraud vulnerability. The control environment is the first component of the 
Integrated Internal Control Framework. The second component is risk assessment.  
b. Risk Assessment 
COSO (2013) defines risk assessment as “the possibility that an event will occur and 
adversely affect the achievement of objectives” (p. 4). Risk assessment involves identifying 
the risk that organizations could face and taking action to prevent them before they occur 
(COSO, 2013). Risk assessment also includes ways of mitigating the identified risk (Rendon 
& Rendon, 2015). When done properly, risk assessment helps to prevent fraud and lends 
creditability to an organization. Risk assessment can provide an opportunity for organizations 
to perform self-assessment and signal management’s commitment to good governance 
(Power, 2007b).  
A Navy husbanding procurement organization could be vulnerable to fraud given a 
weak risk assessment. A hypothetical example of fraud vulnerability would be developing 
and awarding a husbanding contracting vehicle without regard for fraud risk. For example, 
the contract might require the contractor to take certain actions that introduce fraud risk; 
however, if the contracting office did not take steps to develop internal procedures to 
mitigate those risks, or even consider those risks, the risk assessment component would be 
missing, and the likelihood of fraud would be increased. A specific example is the 
development of defined procedures to validate subcontractors against approved vendor lists 
to mitigate the risk of fictitious vendors. Risk assessment is the second component of the 
Integrated Internal Control Framework. The third component is control activities. 
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c. Control Activities 
COSO (2013) defines control activities as “actions established through policies and 
procedures that help ensure that management’s directives to mitigate risks to the achievement 
of objectives are carried out” (p. 4). Control activities consist of specific actions that work to 
mitigate the risk identified in risk assessment (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). Controls within an 
organization signal compliance is expected and demonstrate that management felt strongly 
enough about the behavior that it mandated the activity (Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, 
& Boss, 2009). Segregation of duties and functions within an organization can prevent and 
deter fraud schemes (Wells, 2014). GAO (2014) lists examples of control activities. These 
activities are listed in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Examples of Common Categories of Control Activities 
Source: GAO (2014). 
A Navy husbanding procurement organization could be vulnerable to fraud given 
weak control activities. An example would be Navy shipboard personnel certifying and 
remitting payment to an HSP upon completion of a port visit without first properly validating 
the authenticity of invoices submitted by the HSP. Control activities are the third component 
of the Integrated Internal Controls Framework. The fourth component is monitoring 
activities. 
d. Information and Communication 
Rendon and Rendon (2015) define information and communication as “the accounting 
information system as well as appropriate internal and external communications, calls for 
• Top-level reviews of actual performance 
• Reviews by management at the functional or activity level 
• Management of human capital 
• Controls over information processing 
• Physical control over vulnerable assets 
• Establishment and review of performance measures and indicators 
• Segregation of duties 
• Proper execution of transactions 
• Accurate and timely recording of transactions 
• Access restrictions to and accountability for resources and records 
• Appropriate documentation of transactions and internal control 
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accountability, integrity, and transparency throughout the organization” (p. 717). Timely and 
appropriate communication of information is required to allow employees in an organization to 
execute their responsibilities (GAO, 2001). Problems with information and communication 
within an organization hinder the ability of managers to implement organizational strategy 
(Jensen, 1993). 
A Navy husbanding procurement organization could be vulnerable to fraud given 
weak information and communications. A hypothetical example of fraud vulnerability would 
be government personnel inappropriately revealing the proprietary pricing data of one HSP to 
a competing HSP during the solicitation phase of a husbanding requirement. This would give 
the competitor who received the data an unfair advantage over the competing HSP. 
Information and communication is the fourth component of the Integrated Internal Control 
Framework. The fifth component is monitoring activities. 
e. Monitoring Activities 
COSO (2013) defines monitoring activities as “ongoing evaluations, separate 
evaluations, or some combination of the two” (p. 5). The monitoring activities are used to 
validate the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures in the organization. Monitoring 
activities entails changing control activities as necessary to ensure internal control 
effectiveness is maintained or enhanced (Rendon & Rendon, 2016). Increasing the frequency 
of monitoring activities was found to decrease the willingness of employees to pursue riskier 
decision-making even in cases where the increased risk was justified (Hunton, Mauldin, & 
Wheeler, 2008). 
A Navy husbanding procurement organization could be vulnerable to fraud given 
weak monitoring activities. An example of fraud vulnerability would be a failure by a 
contracting organization performing husbanding service contract-management functions to 
periodically and systemically review, compare, and contrast contract files and closeouts 
following the completion of multiple port visits within a designated area of operation. The 
absence of such a review might allow unscrupulous HSP contractors to perpetrate frauds 
against multiple contracting officers in the same office or across satellite offices. Contracting 
organizations that perform husbanding contract management across disparate area of 
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operations are especially prone to fraud in the absence of a holistic organization-wide 
monitoring program.  
2. COSO Principles 
The COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework establishes 17 principles 
associated with each internal control component (COSO, 2013). These principles are 
extracted directly from the COSO 2013 Internal Control—Integrated Framework, executive 
summary document and are depicted in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Principles of the Internal Control Components.  
Source: Weaver, (2013). 
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This section discussed the five components of the COSO Integrated Internal Control 
Framework. Additionally, the 17 principles associated with each internal control component 
were presented. In the next section, procurement fraud schemes will be discussed. 
F. PROCUREMENT FRAUD SCHEMES 
Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) defines fraud as “a knowing misrepresentation of the 
truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment” (p. 
685). Rendon and Rendon (2015) state that fraud within government procurement can be 
characterized into six broad categories, which include “collusion, conflict of interest, bid 
rigging, billing, cost, and pricing schemes, fraudulent purchases, and fraudulent 
representations” (p. 9). This research study will stratify each allegation of fraud perpetrated 
in the Fat Leonard case into these six broad schemes.  
1. Collusion 
Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) defines collusion as “an agreement to defraud another 
or to do or obtain something forbidden by law” (p. 281). Wells (2014) states that collusion 
occurs when multiple personnel conspire to “overcome well-designed internal controls of a 
victim company” (p. 100). Bribery, kickbacks, and split purchases are specific schemes that 
fall under the category of collusion (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). Black’s Law Dictionary 
(2004) defines bribery as “the corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for 
an official action” (p. 204). Henning (2001) states that international conventions developed to 
combat corruption recognize bribery as the “paradigm” of corruption and define bribery as an 
offer of “advantage” tendered in exchange for the discharge of official duties (Henning, p. 
796). Wells (2014) describes a bribe as a business transaction where a “person ‘buys’ 
something with the bribe he pays” (Wells, 2014, p. 244).  
In Navy husbanding, a hypothetical example of a bribe might induce a contracting 
officer to manipulate the source selection process to award a contract to a specific contractor, 
or manipulate the contract administration process to yield additional contract modifications 
or change orders, or cause or make known fraudulent invoices or claims to be paid. 
Additionally, in Navy husbanding, bribes might induce ship planners to write Navy ship 
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schedules to route ships to specific ports of call whereby one particular contractor is given an 
inherent advantage.  
A kickback is another scheme under the collusion category. Black’s Law Dictionary 
(2004) defines a kickback as “a return of a portion of a monetary sum received especially as 
the result of coercion or a secret agreement” (p. 886). Wells (2014) states the purpose of a 
kickback is “usually to enlist the corrupt employee in an overbilling scheme” (p. 244). 
Kickback arrangements can also include situations where confidential data is leaked by an 
employee in a procurement organization to a bidder or offeror in exchange for some item of 
value (Davies, 1995). 
In Navy husbanding procurement, a hypothetical example of a kickback might take 
the form of a secret agreement between a prime contractor and subcontractor, where the 
prime contracts with a specific subcontractor on the basis that the subcontractor will submit 
inflated invoices for husbanding services related to a port visit. Following payment by the 
government, the prime will remit the inflated amount, or some portion thereof, back to the 
subcontractor. 
Chang (2013) describes split purchases as “multiple parties conspiring to circumvent 
government procurement thresholds which could trigger additional demands for competition, 
oversight, or justification” (p. 19). In Navy husbanding procurement, a hypothetical example 
of split purchases might involve a contracting officer and contractor conspiring to keep a 
contracting action below a certain dollar threshold to keep the action from having to go to a 
higher level for review and approval, such that the contracting officer is able to field the 
action independent of higher level review. 
2. Conflict of Interest 
Black’s Law Dictionary (2004) defines conflict of interest as “a real or seeming 
incompatibility between one’s private interests and one’s public or fiduciary duties” (p. 319). 
In federal procurement, conflicts of interest arise from “financial interests of the covered 
employee, of close family members, or of other members of the covered employee’s 
household, other employment or financial relationships (including seeking or negotiating for 
prospective employment or business); and Gifts, including travel” (FAR, 2017, FAR 3.1101). 
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FAR 3.11 establishes specific policy and provides guidance on the handling of conflicts of 
interest. A hypothetical example of a conflict of interest in Navy husbanding procurement 
would be a case where a contracting officer was involved in the source selection of a 
husbanding contract, and the spouse of that contracting officer was employed by an HSP that 
had submitted an offer. If the contracting officer failed to take the steps called for in FAR 
3.11, a conflict of interest exists. 
3. Bid Rigging 
Wells (2005) describes bid rigging as a scheme in which a competitor uses fraud to 
gain an advantage over his competitors in securing a contract. Bid rigging can occur in many 
forms and in different phases of the contract management process. In the procurement 
planning phase, bid rigging may include schemes such as the buyer developing requirements 
with specifications that can be filled only via one particular contractor (Wells, 2014). Thus, 
competition is restricted to that one contractor. In the solicitation phase, bid rigging can take 
the form of a conspiracy between multiple parties such that offers are prepared and 
orchestrated by offerors to create the conditions that allow only one particular offeror to win 
the award or such that work can be split amongst the offerors (Wells, 2014). Submission of 
bids/offers from fictitious suppliers is another form of bid rigging (Wells, 2014). A 
hypothetical example of bid rigging in the Navy husbanding procurement would be a 
husbanding contractor submitting bids for services from subcontractors they had fictitiously 
created. This would create the appearance of competition, but in fact create a situation where 
the contractor would actually provide the service and charge prices exceeding market prices. 
4. Billing, Cost, and Pricing Schemes 
Wells (2014) explains that a billing scheme involves a perpetrator’s use of “false 
documentation—such as an invoice, purchase order, or purchase card bill—to cause his employer 
to issue payment for some fraudulent purpose” (p. 97). This scheme may include the use of 
fictitious companies or false documents to submit fraudulent invoices that create the illusion that 
a service was tendered (Wells, 2014). Wells (2014) states that “most billing schemes succeed 
when an individual has control over one or more aspects of purchasing, authorizing purchases, 
receiving and storing goods, and issuing payments” (p. 101). Wells (2014) argues that that 
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segregation of these duties and internal procedures, such as the use of an approved vendors list, 
can prevent these schemes. Grennan and McCrory (2016) state that, “Generally, billing schemes 
are more common when pricing is not verified against current market competition, opening the 
door to price inflation” (p. 26). A hypothetical example of a billing, cost, and pricing scheme in 
Navy husbanding procurement is a husbanding contractor overcharging for the disposal of 
collection, holding, and transfer (CHT) waste if a ship lacks the ability to measure the volume of 
waste transferred. In this example, the lack of a meter to measure the exact volume of CHT waste 
transferred, assuming the absence of procedures to measure the tank before and after the waste 
removal, gives the contractor the potential to overbill the Navy. 
5. Fraudulent Purchases 
Castillo and Flanigan (2014) describe fraudulent purchases as “those in which a 
buyer acquires materials without having a specific government requirement but rather for 
personal use” (p. 26). A 2008 government-wide review of the program conducted by the 
GAO revealed internal control weaknesses in the Government Commercial Purchase Card 
(GCPC) programs “that left the government vulnerable to fraudulent purchases” (GAO, 
2017, p. 2). However, in a 2017 review in which the GAO reviewed samples of purchases 
from various cabinet departments and federal agencies, the GAO found no instances of 
fraudulent purchases. Based on its review and statistical testing, the GAO estimated that 22% 
of transactions government-wide, 23% of DOD transactions, and 13% of VA transactions 
have incomplete documentation (GAO, 2017). Wells (2014) contends that most fraudulent 
purchases occur because of employees “running unsanctioned invoices through the accounts 
payable system” (p. 109). Therefore, it is vital that the federal government and the DOD 
continue to emphasize the importance of appropriate documentation in GCPC operations. A 
hypothetical example of fraudulent purchases in Navy husbanding procurement is a 
contracting officer making a purchase of hand tools for the purpose of converting the tools 
for personal use, but making the purchase under the auspices of a Navy ship’s port visit. 
6. Fraudulent Representations 
The final procurement fraud scheme identified is fraudulent representations. Grennan 
and McCrory (2016) refer to fraudulent representations as “bait and switch,” where the actual 
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product provided by a contractor is substituted with one of inferior quality. Chang (2013) 
states that fraudulent representation occurs “when a contractor gains financially from 
providing goods or services that do not meet the standards of what is required in the contract” 
(p. 21). Wells (2005) adds that fraudulent representation also includes an over-charging 
element whereby the customer is paying an inflated price for actual goods provided or 
services tendered. In Navy husbanding procurement, a hypothetical example of fraudulent 
representation is a husbanding contractor winning an award to furnish fuel of a particular 
specification but instead secretly furnish a fuel of an inferior quality while disguising it as the 
superior fuel. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter first reviewed the literature on Navy husbanding processes and husbanding 
processes used in the private sector. Next, the chapter discussed auditability theory and its 
associated components of competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal 
controls. The contract management framework was discussed and was presented from both the 
buying and selling perspective. A discussion of the Integrated Internal Control Framework was 
also presented. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the six most common fraud scheme 
categories. The next chapter presents an overview of Navy husbanding contracting organizations, 
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III. HISTORY OF GDMA AND HSP CONTRACTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an overview of Navy husbanding contracting organizations, a 
history of Glenn Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), and a timeline of GDMA’s contracting 
activity and ultimate demise. Additionally, this chapter seeks to explain the contracting 
strategies and contract vehicles employed by the Navy in executing port visits in Asia during 
the time of the GDMA case. This sets the stage for the subsequent chapters by providing an 
overview of the Fat Leonard case and the specific husbanding contracting strategies 
employed by the Navy in the 7th Fleet area of operations. 
B. CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONS 
During the 2005–2006 period, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) 
subsumed the Navy Regional Contracting Centers (NRCC) that were located across the globe 
into the NAVSUP Fleet Industrial Supply Center Organization (FISC). In February 2006, 
NRCC Singapore was disestablished and stood up as the Fleet Industrial Supply Center 
Yokosuka, Detachment, Singapore (Commander, Fleet Industrial and Supply Centers, Public 
Affairs, 2006).  
The NRCCs employed varying husbanding service contracting methodologies and 
differing contract types. Upon assuming the contracting function, NAVSUP intended “to 
adopt a standardized policy for use by all FISCs when evaluating and executing [HSPs]” 
(Gundemir, Manalang, Metzger, & Pitel, 2007, p. 2). As such, NAVSUP undertook a 
strategic review of HSP contracting to determine the global environment, desired end states, 
and areas for improvement (Gundemir, Manalang, Metzger, & Pitel, 2007). This section 
discussed the Navy’s husbanding contracting organization structure and differing husbanding 
service contracting methodologies. A discussion of GDMA’s history from 1946–2000 is 
discussed in the next section. 
C. GDMA 1946–2000 
For over 25 years, the U.S. Navy contracted with GDMA, a Singapore-based firm, to 
provide husbanding services for Navy ships making port calls in the Asia/Pacific region 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 46 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
(Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). As discussed in Chapter I, 
Leonard Glenn Francis, a Malaysian national known by Navy personnel as “Fat Leonard” 
because of his large stature, led the firm. Francis’s maternal grandfather founded the 
maritime logistics business in Malaysia in 1946 to capitalize on the needs of merchant ships 
transiting the Strait of Malacca (Whitlock, 2016a).  
Upon the closure of U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay, Philippines, Navy ships started to 
make more and more port visits throughout Asia. This presented Francis and GDMA with an 
opportunity to participate in Navy HSP contracts (Whitlock, 2016a). By the early 2000s, 
Francis moved the firm’s headquarters to Singapore and opened offices throughout Asia 
(Whitlock, 2016a). “At this time, GDMA had secured contracts to service Navy ships in 
ports from Vladivostok, Russia, to Papua New Guinea. Francis also received contracts from 
the navies of France, Mexico, India, and the Netherlands” (Whitlock, 2016a). This section 
provided an overview of GDMA’s history from 1946–2000. A discussion of GDMA’s 
husbanding contracting service activity during the 2005–2010 time period is discussed in the 
next section. 
D. GDMA 2005–2010 
Publicly available documents show that in late 2005, the Navy began to contemplate 
the award of two long-term indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts to 
provide HSP services in the Philippines and Thailand. In February 2006, the Navy Fleet 
Industrial Supply Center Yokosuka, Detachment Singapore, awarded GDMA a long-term 
IDIQ contact for husbanding support services in Thailand, with the first year of the contract 
being valued at $929,649 (Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). With 
options, this contract had a total value of over $7,100,000 (Information, United States of 
America v. Simpkins, 2016). In December 2006, the Navy exercised a one-year option for 
this contract. An option was also exercised in February 2008 (Indictment, United States of 
America v. Simpkins, 2015).  
In December 2006, the Navy Fleet Industrial Supply Center Yokosuka, Detachment 
Singapore, awarded GDMA a long-term IDIQ contract for husbanding support services in the 
Philippines. The first year of this contract was valued at $523,994 (Indictment, United States 
of America v. Simpkins, 2015). The Navy exercised a one-year option for this contract in 
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December 2007 (Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). In January 2007, 
a competitor filed a bid protest against GDMA, resulting in the suspension of all contract 
awards to GDMA in the Philippines (Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, 
Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). In February 
2007, the GAO dismissed the protest and the suspension was lifted (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Brooks, 2016). Based on a review of publicly available information, it 
appears that the Philippines contract ran to completion with all available options being 
exercised. Both the Thailand contract and the Philippines contract included unpriced contract 
line items to support incidental goods and services falling within the scope of the contracts 
but not specifically enumerated in the contracts. 
On May 6, 2010, the Navy Fleet Industrial Supply Center Yokosuka, Detachment 
Singapore contemplated the award of a fixed-price IDIQ instrument for a 12-month period 
with an option period of six months. The request for proposal (RFP) was for the following 
four lots in the Republic of the Philippines: Lot 1—Manila, Lot 2—Subic Bay, Lot 3—
Puerto Princesa, Lot 4—Cebu. On August 27, 2010, a split award was made to GDMA for 
lots 3 and 4 and to Global Ship Management and Marine Service, Inc. for lots 1 and 2 
(Comptroller General, 2010). This section discussed GDMA’s husbanding service 
contracting activity during the 2005–2010 time period. GDMA’s husbanding service 
contracting activity in Japan from July 2009 to December 2010 is discussed in the next 
section. 
E. GDMA JAPAN CONTRACTS 
During the period of July 1, 2009, to December 31, 2010, GDMA held the contract to 
provide husbanding support to U.S. Navy vessels making ports of call in Japan (Information, 
United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014). This contract required GDMA subcontractors to 
submit their bills directly to the Navy (Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 
2014). After completion of services, Navy shipboard personnel would remit payment to the 
subcontractor directly (Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014). This section 
discussed GDMA’s husbanding service contracting activity in Japan from July 2009 to 
December 2010. The Navy’s shift toward a regional husbanding service contracting strategy 
is discussed in the next section. 
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F. NAVY’S SHIFT TO REGIONAL HUSBANDING SERVICE CONTRACTING 
A review of the publicly accessible Federal Data Procurement System website 
(http://www.fpds/gov) conducted on August 4, 2017, using the keyword “Glenn Defense 
Marine” reveals that GDMA held a variety of IDIQ contracts for various ports of calls in 
addition to the Thailand and Philippines contracts. GDMA also received a multitude of 
contracts relating to one-time port visits during this time frame of 2005–2010. To reduce the 
number of one-time contracts issued to support individual ports/countries for which the Navy 
did not hold existing IDIQ contract vehicles, the “[Navy Fleet Industrial Supply Center 
Yokosuka] initialized the regionalization of husbanding contracts in the 7th Fleet area of 
operations, proposing the creation of four regions” (Marquez, Rayos, & Mercado, 2009). The 
four regions were South Asia (Region 1, including, among other countries, Bangladesh, 
Burma, India, and Sri Lanka); South East Asia (Region 2, including, among other countries, 
Cambodia, China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam); Australia and the Pacific 
Islands (Region 3, including, among other countries, Australia, New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea, Fiji, French Polynesia, and Western Samoa); and East Asia (Region 4, including 
Japan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Russia) (Glenn Defense Marine [Asia], PTE Ltd. v. 
United States of America and MLS—Multinational Logistic Service Ltd., 2012).  
In November 2009, the Navy Fleet Industrial Supply Center Yokosuka solicited bids 
for husbanding support services for the four regions. The RFP “contemplated four awards, 
one for each region, and instructed offerors to submit a separate proposal for each region in 
which they were interested” (Comptroller General, 2011, p. 1). The RFP explained that each 
region would be serviced by a separate firm-fixed price IDIQ type contract (Comptroller 
General, 2011). Each contract would consist of a one-year base period and four one-year 
options (Glenn Defense Marine [Asia], PTE Ltd. v. United States of America and MLS—
Multinational Logistic Service Ltd., 2013). In and around the summer of 2011, GDMA was 
awarded IDIQ contracts for all the regions except Region 1 (Indictment, United States of 
America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). GDMA failed to win the contract for Region 1, despite 
being 64% below their competitor’s total price (Glenn Defense Marine [Asia], PTE Ltd. v. 
United States of America and MLS—Multinational Logistic Service Ltd., 2013). This was 
because the Source Selection Authority used a trade-off process to determine award. The 
solicitation stated “the following factors, in order of importance, shall be used to evaluate 
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acceptable offers: Technical Approach, Past Performance, and Price. The non-price factors, 
when combined, are significantly more important than price.” (Glenn Defense Marine [Asia], 
PTE Ltd. v. United States of America and MLS—Multinational Logistic Service, 2013, p. 4). 
In addition, GDMA was assessed a past performance rating of “less than satisfactory” (Glenn 
Defense Marine [Asia], PTE Ltd. v. United States of America and MLS—Multinational 
Logistic Service, 2013, p. 12). This section discussed the Navy’s shift toward a regional 
husbanding service contracting strategy. A discussion of the Region 2 contract that was 
awarded to GDMA is discussed in the next section. 
G. GDMA REGION 2 CONTRACT 
The Region 2 contract consisted of a one-year base period worth $25,000,000 and 
four option years (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013). The contract 
inclusive of option years was worth a total of $125,000,000 (Indictment, United States of 
America v. Peterson, Raja). The Region 2 contract established pricing for a variety of 
husbanding services and established fixed prices. The contract also covered un-priced 
incidentals. Incidentals were items or services “that fell within the general scope of 
husbanding services but were not enumerated as fixed price items” (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Peterson, Raja, p. 3). Based on the publically available documents 
describing the Region 2 contract, GDMA was allowed to compete with other vendors to 
provide incidental services provided it disclosed in their quote to the contracting officer “any 
profit or markup” (Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014, p.3). Along 
with its quote, “GDMA would also submit an Authorized Government Representative Form 
(AGR Form) in which GDMA would recommend a source. After receiving the quotes and 
the AGR form, the Navy contracting officer would select which vendor to use for each 
incidental” (Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014, p. 3).  
The Region 2 contract allowed GDMA to receive a fixed fee in cases where it 
arranged for the purchase of fuel and required GDMA to invoice the Navy for GDMA’s 
actual fuel costs (Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). 
Additionally, the Region 2 contract dictated that “GDMA was required to bill the Navy for 
actual costs paid to Port Authorities for port tariffs, without any markup” (Complaint, United 
States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013, p. 6). Per the terms of the Region 2 contract, the 
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ship receiving the service made payments to GDMA for services rendered (Indictment, 
United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). Accordingly, GDMA would submit to 
Navy shipboard personnel a claim for payment at the end of the ship’s port visit. This 
typically consisted of invoices for all husbanding services provided during the ship’s port 
visit (Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014).  
Within each region, some ports were considered by GDMA to be more lucrative than 
other ports. Francis termed these to be “pearl ports” (Complaint, United States of America v. 
Francis and Misiewicz, 2013, p. 5) One such port was the Port Klang Cruise Center (PKCC) 
located at Port Klang, Malaysia, which Francis purchased in August 2009 (Standifer, 2017). 
This section discussed the Region 2 contract that was awarded to GDMA. The criminal 
investigations launched into GDMA business practices are discussed in the next section. 
H. GDMA CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
In July 2010, contracting officers at Navy Fleet Industrial Supply Center Yokosuka, 
Detachment Singapore become suspicious of invoices presented by GDMA in connection 
with three Navy vessels that visited Thailand as part of Cooperation Afloat Readiness 
Training (CARAT) exercises in May 2010. Prior to these exercises, the Navy and Royal Thai 
Navy had agreed that Navy ships would not be charged dockage or wharfage fees in 
Thailand. In June 2010, GDMA submitted claims and invoices to the Navy for $110,000 in 
dockage and wharfage fees (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Beliveau, 
2013). NCIS initiated an investigation. 
In June 2010, NCIS also initiated a separate fraud investigation regarding GDMA 
subcontractor fraud related to GDMA’s husbanding contracts in Japan (Complaint, United 
States of America v. Francis and Beliveau, 2013). In spring 2012, NCIS opened another 
investigation to determine whether GDMA was overbilling the Navy through the creation 
and submission of fraudulent subcontractor bids associated with task orders issued against 
the Region 2 contract (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Beliveau, 2013). 
According to a heavily redacted internal report produced by the NCIS Economic Crimes 
Department in 2014 and obtained by the San Diego Union-Tribune in response to a Freedom 
of Information Act request, NCIS and other agencies produced 10 criminal intelligence 
reports and initiated 14 investigations on GDMA between 2004 and 2012 (Prine, 2017). 
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According to Prine (2017), the tips included an anonymous letter in mid-2007 that was 
passed to NCIS by the Navy’s Inspector General making allegations that GDMA was 
overcharging for force protection services in Southeast Asia. Tips also included allegations 
by Marine Corps contracting officers that GDMA used the Indonesian military to harm a 
competitor, and a 2009 tip to NCIS by a confidential informant that GDMA was overbilling 
for port services in Thailand (Prine, 2017). Another tip included a call to a DOD hotline in 
late 2009 noting questionable invoices for vehicles, sewage treatment, fuel, and port tariffs 
that were similar to the suspicions of Navy Fleet Industrial Supply Center Yokosuka 
contracting officers (Prine, 2017). This section discussed criminal investigations launched 
into GDMA business practices. GDMA’s demise is discussed in the next section. 
I. GDMA’S DEMISE 
In July 2013, Francis was provided with false information planted by U.S. 
investigators that all NCIS investigations were closing (United States of America v. 
Misiewicz, 2015). In September 2013, he was lured to the United States under the auspices 
that he was to meet with Navy admirals to discuss lucrative husbanding contract 
opportunities. Instead, he was arrested on September 13, 2013, in San Diego (Whitlock, 
2016a).  
In January 2015, Francis pled guilty to a host of bribery and conspiracy charges. He 
remains a cooperating witness to the U.S. Department of Justice (Plea Agreement, United 
States v. Glenn Defense Marine-Asia PTE, Ltd., 2015). According to the public accessible 
System for Award Management website (https://www.sam.gov), the Department of the Navy 
declared Glenn Defense Marine and all its associated entities to be ineligible for government 
contracts on September 18, 2013. In November 2013, the Navy terminated the three regional 
husbanding contracts held by GDMA (Perry, 2013). As of August 22, 2017, 28 Navy 
personnel (active duty and civilian) have been indicted on federal charges that allege offenses 
such as bribery, bid rigging, fraudulent invoice submission, and conspiracy to defraud the 
U.S. government. In 2015, three active-duty Navy flag officers were censured by the 
Secretary of the Navy for allegedly accepting gifts, meals, and other items of values at prices 
well below market value. These admirals were forced to retire (Larter, 2015). In July 2014, 
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the Singaporean firm Boustead Holdings Bhd, purchased Port Klang from GDMA receivers 
(Khuen, 2014). 
J. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of Navy husbanding contracting organizations, a 
history of GDMA, and a timeline of GDMA’s contracting activity and ultimate demise. 
Additionally, the chapter explained the Navy’s husbanding contracting strategies and 
contract vehicles employed in Asia during the timeline of the alleged fraudulent activities. 
The next chapter provides the methodology used to conduct research on the Fat Leonard 
case. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the methodology used for this research. The research includes 
a literature review covering peer-reviewed articles, newspaper articles, and government 
documents related to contract management processes, internal controls, and procurement 
fraud schemes. This chapter first explains how a database was developed to record all 
publicly known allegations of fraud against personnel indicted and implicated in the Fat 
Leonard case. The sources of data used to populate the database are discussed. The chapter 
then explains how each allegation of fraud against each individual was aligned with an 
internal control component and a contract management phase, and how each act was 
categorized into one of the six most common procurement fraud scheme categories. The 
chapter concludes by discussing the database composition. An explanation of how the Fat 
Leonard Fraud Database was developed is discussed in the next section. 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAT LEONARD FRAUD DATABASE 
Data collection began by accessing press releases issued by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) to obtain the names of personnel implicated in the Fat Leonard case and to understand 
the summary of alleged offenses. Next, publicly available DOJ criminal indictments, criminal 
complaints, criminal information documents, and criminal superseding information 
documents were obtained. These documents provided the specific allegations of fraud and 
overt acts alleged to have been perpetrated by individuals indicted in the Fat Leonard case.  
Upon review of these official, publicly available documents, a database was 
developed to support this research study. Each act of alleged fraud was extracted from the 
applicable documents and populated into a database. Within the database, a table was created 
for each indicted person. Within each person’s table, each allegation of fraud was listed in 
chronological order. In situations where other indicted persons were implicated in the same 
act, each alleged act was listed within the other person’s or persons’ table. In the case of the 
three Navy admirals who received letters of censure related to the Fat Leonard case, the 
database was populated based on data obtained from newspaper articles that described the 
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reasons for the Secretary of Navy’s decision to issue a letter of censure to each admiral. A list 
of the specific documents used to construct the database can be found in the appendix. 
In the case of one civilian Singaporean national who was previously employed by the 
Navy as a lead contracting specialist, the fraud database was populated based on charges 
contained in a publicly available document filed before the Singaporean court by the 
Government of Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. The next section explains 
the sources of data entered into the database. 
1. Sources 
The DOJ’s website (http://www.justice.gov), which is a publicly accessible website, 
was used to retrieve press releases issued by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
California and U.S. Attorney for the District of Hawaii when personnel were indicted before 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California and the United States 
District Court for the District of Hawaii, or when there were other updates in an indicted 
person’s case were made available.  
The Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) website (https://www. 
pacer.gov/login.html) was used to retrieve DOJ and federal court documents. The PACER 
website is open to the public and requires a membership account that is free of charge. The 
website charges a download fee of $.10 per page.  
The PlainSite website (https://www.plainsite.org) was also used to retrieve DOJ and 
federal court documents. The PlainSite website is open to the public and requires a 
membership account that costs $9.99 per month. There is a charge of $.15 per page after 
requesting the first three documents, which are free of charge.  
Effective March 15, 2017, Google Alerts (https://www.gmail.com) was used to set 
automatic filters on the researcher’s personal e-mail accounts to capture newspaper, 
magazine, and online articles that included the terms “Fat Leonard,” “GDMA,” and “Glenn 
Defense Marine.” 
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2. Search Terms 
Search terms were used to query the websites listed in the preceding sections. These 
terms included the specific names of persons implicated in the Fat Leonard procurement 
fraud case and those persons indicted by the U.S. district courts. These websites were also 
queried using federal court docket numbers, the terms “Fat Leonard,” “GDMA,” “Glenn 
Defense Marine,” “Glenn Defense Marine Asia,” and “Navy Husbanding Agent.” The next 
section discusses how each alleged act of fraud was aligned with an internal control 
component, contract management phase for both the buyer and seller, and categorized into a 
procurement fraud scheme. 
C. ALIGNMENT TO FRAMEWORKS AND FRAUD SCHEMES 
After populating the Fat Leonard Fraud Database with each act of fraud alleged in 
official publicly available documents and organizing the alleged acts in a table for each 
indicted person, each alleged act was aligned with an integrated internal control component, 
a contract management phase for both the buyer and seller, and a procurement fraud scheme. 
Alignment of each alleged fraudulent act to an internal control component and contract 
management process is subjective in nature. Several of the alleged fraudulent acts overlapped 
multiple internal control components and contract management processes. In these cases, the 
alleged fraudulent act was aligned with the internal control component that most contributed 
to the alleged act being perpetrated and the contract management phase in which the 
preponderance of the activity occurred. The same process previously discussed was applied 
to the database specific to the three Navy admirals censured by the Secretary of the Navy. 
The next section discusses a description of how each alleged act of fraud was aligned.  
1. Alignment to Contract Management Phases 
Each alleged act of fraud was aligned with a contract management phase from both 
the buyer’s and seller’s perspective using the six-phase contract management framework, 
based on the contract management phase in which the act took place. In this aligned process, 
each individual task order issued under an IDIQ contract was treated as a separate contract 
action. Alignment of each phase was based on the preponderance of activity in which the act 
occurred. Some alleged acts influenced the contract management process but could not be 
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categorized into any of the six phases of the contract management process. Accordingly, 
these acts were aligned a contract management phase of “other.” The “other” phase is 
explained in more detail later. The next section discusses an explanation of how the alleged 
acts of fraud were aligned to the applicable internal control component. 
2. Alignment to Internal Control Components 
Each alleged act of fraud was aligned with an internal control component as defined 
by the COSO integrated internal control framework (COSO, 2013). Alignment was based on 
the absence of the internal control component that most contributed to and allowed for the 
alleged act of fraud to be perpetrated. In cases where more than one internal control 
component was identified, the component most responsible for permitting the alleged act to 
occur was chosen. The next section explains how each alleged act was categorized into a 
procurement fraud scheme. 
3. Categorization of Fraud Schemes 
Each alleged act of fraud was categorized into one of the six procurement fraud 
scheme categories, which include the most common schemes within government 
procurement (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). Each act was reviewed and assessed against the 
fraud schemes defined in Chapter II of this research paper. The next section discusses the 
results of the data compiled in the Fat Leonard Fraud Database. 
D. DATABASE COMPOSITION 
As described in the preceding section, each allegation of fraud contained in the Fat 
Leonard Fraud Database was aligned with an internal control component, and a contract 
management phase, as well as categorized into a procurement fraud scheme. The database 
contains a total of 31 tables. The total number of all alleged acts of fraud, which is equal to 
the total number of alleged fraudulent acts taken from each table and summed together, is 
1,194.  
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methodology for this research. The chapter also discussed 
the literature review covering peer-reviewed articles, newspaper articles, and government 
documents related to contract management processes, internal controls, and procurement 
fraud schemes. The chapter discussed the sources of data used and described the 
development of a database used for this research study. Additionally, the chapter explained 
how each act of alleged fraud in the case was aligned with the applicable contract 
management phase, the applicable internal control component, and categorized into a 
procurement fraud scheme. An explanation of how the database is composed was provided. 
The next chapter discusses the findings and analysis of the research. It also discusses the 
implications of the findings and presents recommendations to the Navy on enhancing the 
competency of all HSP process stakeholders, on improving HSP contract process 
capabilities, and strengthening HSP contracting internal controls. 
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V. FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the findings, analysis, implications, and recommendations 
based on the research findings. First, findings in regard to the analysis of data in the Fat 
Leonard Fraud Database are provided. The findings consist of the contract management 
phases in which the alleged acts of fraud occurred, the internal controls that were deficient 
and allowed the alleged acts to occur, and the specific procurement fraud schemes that 
allegedly occurred in the Fat Leonard case. Next, an analysis of these findings is presented. 
Finally, recommendations based on research findings are provided. 
B. FINDINGS  
The Fat Leonard Fraud Database contained 31 tables, representing the 31 personnel 
accused of malfeasance in the Fat Leonard case. In total, there are 1,194 alleged acts of fraud. 
In some instances, the alleged acts of fraud involved several of the accused persons. In these 
instances, each alleged act was counted for each person separately. The following tables and 
figures reflect the analysis of the Fat Leonard Fraud Database, which was developed from 
publicly available federal criminal indictments, criminal complaints, criminal information 
documents, and criminal superseding information documents. 
1. Contract Management Processes 
Each alleged act of fraud was aligned with a contract management phase from both 
the buyer’s and seller’s perspective using the six-phase contract management framework 
based on the contract management phase in which the act took place. The alleged fraudulent 
act was aligned with the contract management phases in which the preponderance of the 
alleged act of fraud took place. For allegations of fraud that could not be aligned under any of 
the six phases of the contract management process, a phase of “other” was used to align the 
fraud. Acts of alleged fraud that were aligned into the “other phase” predominately consisted 
of allegations that involved Navy officials who were once directly involved in the GDMA 
conspiracy and later left the conspiracy due to reassignment within the Navy. According to 
these allegations, these officials subsequently attempted to obtain items of value from 
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GDMA such as cash, the services of prostitutes, and employment opportunities, despite the 
fact that these officials no longer occupied positions that allowed them to execute official 
acts or influence acts that would enrich GDMA. Other allegations of fraud aligned into the 
“other” phase also included acts of alleged collusion between a Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS) agent and GDMA.  
a. Buyer’s Side 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the alleged acts of fraud during each of the buyer’s 
contract management phases across the 1,194 alleged fraudulent acts. 





As reflected in Table 1, a significant number of the alleged acts of fraud (308) 
occurred in the contract administration phase. In addition, the second highest number of 
alleged acts (229) occurred in the procurement planning phase. This distribution is also 
reflected in Figure 9, which shows that 26% of the alleged acts occurred in the contract 
administration phase and 19% in the procurement planning phase. 
Buyer's Contract Management Phase Number of Acts of Alleged Fraud 
 
   
Procurement Planning 229 
 Solicitation Planning 218 
 Solicitation 47 
 Source Selection 32 
 Contract Administration 308 
 Contract closeout or termination 
phase 141 
 “Other” 219 
 Total Alleged Acts of Fraud 1194 
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Figure 9.  Percent of Alleged Fraud Acts by Buyer’s Contract Management Phases 
b. Seller’s Side 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the alleged acts of fraud distributed throughout the 
seller’s contract management phases.  
Table 2.   Distribution of Alleged Fraud Acts among Seller’s Contract Management 
Phases 
Seller’s Contract Management 
Phase Number of Acts of Alleged Fraud 
  Pre-Sales Activity 359 
Bid or No Bid Decision Making 0 
Bid or Proposal Preparation 268 
Contract Negotiation and Formation 35 
Contract Administration 305 
Contract Closeout or Termination  102 
“Other” 125 
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As reflected in Table 2, a significant number (359) of the alleged acts of fraud 
occurred in the seller’s pre-sales activity phase. In addition, the second highest number of 
alleged acts (305) occurred in the contract administration phase. This distribution is also 
reflected in Figure 10, which shows that 30% of the alleged acts of fraud occurred in the pre-
sales activity phase and 26% in the contract administration phase.  
It should be noted that the research did not identify any allegations of fraud that 
aligned under the bid or no bid decision-making phase. This was because relevant allegations 
of fraud found in the publicly available documents pertained only to husbanding actions in 
which it appeared that GDMA had determined that it would submit a bid or proposal. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Percent of Alleged Fraud Acts by Seller’s Contract Management Phases 
2. Internal Control Failures 
Each allegation of fraud was aligned to an internal control component as defined by the 
COSO Integrated Internal Control framework (COSO, 2013). Each allegation of fraud was 
aligned based on the deficiency of the primary internal control component that most contributed 
to and allowed the fraudulent act to be perpetrated. Table 3 shows the internal control 
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Table 3.   Distribution of Internal Control Failures 
 
 
As reflected in Table 3, a significant number of the alleged acts of fraud (621) 
occurred due to the deficiency of the control environment component. In addition, the second 
highest number of alleged acts (452) occurred due to the deficiency of the information and 
communications component. This distribution is also reflected in Figure 11, which shows 
that 52% of the alleged acts occurred because of the deficiency of an effective control 
environment. In addition, Figure 11 shows that 38% of the alleged acts occurred due to the 
deficiency of an effective information and communications component. 
It should be noted that the research did not identify any instances in which risk 
assessment was the primary internal control deficiency that permitted the alleged acts of 
fraud to occur. This is because the allegations of fraud involve overt acts and the definition of 
risk assessment provided in Chapter II states that risk assessment involves “The 
identification, analysis, and management of risk faced by an organization” (Chang, 2013, p. 
16). However, because fraud allegedly occurred, it can be argued that each act of alleged 
fraud could be aligned with the risk assessment component. Effective risk assessment would 
have prevented the alleged fraud from occurring. However, given the limitation of this 
research to align each alleged act of fraud with the primary internal control component that 
permitted the alleged act to occur, no alleged acts of fraud were aligned to risk assessment in 
this research study. The next section discusses the procurement fraud scheme findings. 
 




 Control Environment 621 
 Risk Assessment 0 
 Information and Communications 452 
 Control Activities 104 
 Monitoring Activities 17 
 Total Alleged Acts of Fraud 1194 
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Figure 11.  Internal Control Failures 
3. Procurement Fraud Schemes 
Each allegation of fraud was categorized into a procurement fraud scheme. Table 4 
shows the distribution of the procurement fraud schemes allegedly perpetrated in the Fat 
Leonard case.  
Table 4.   Distribution of Procurement Fraud Schemes 
Fraud Scheme Number of Alleged Acts of Fraud 
  Collusion 1094 
Conflict of Interest 12 
Bid Rigging 39 
Billing, Cost and Pricing 
Schemes 44 
Fraudulent Purchases 0 
Fraudulent 
Representations 5 
Total Alleged Acts of Fraud 1194 
As reflected in Table 4, an overwhelming majority of the allegations of fraud (1094) 
were categorized as collusion. This is also reflected in Figure 12, which shows that nearly 
92% of the allegations of fraud fell under the collusion fraud scheme. It should be noted that 
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the research did not identify any allegations of fraud that fell under the category of fraudulent 
purchases based on the definition of fraudulent purchases provided in Chapter II of this 
report. 
 
Figure 12.  Procurement Fraud Schemes as a Percentage of Total Alleged Acts of Fraud 
This section presented the research findings. In the next section, an analysis of the 
findings and implications are discussed. 
C. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This section will discuss the analysis of findings and implications as they relate to the 
six phases of both the buyer’s and seller’s sides of the contract management process. Next, 
the discussion of the analysis of the findings as they relate to the internal control components 
will be discussed. Finally, a discussion of the analysis of the findings as they relate to the 
different procurement fraud schemes will be provided. 
1. Contract Management Processes 
Based on the research findings, allegations of procurement fraud in the Fat Leonard 
case occurred in all phases of the contract management process. An analysis of the contract 
management phases, from both the buyer’s and seller’s perspective, is discussed in the next 
sections.   
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a. Buyer’s Side 
(1) Procurement Planning 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the procurement planning 
phase primarily consisted of efforts taken by Navy officials to route Navy ships to “pearl 
ports” (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013, p. 5). One such 
port was the Port Klang Cruise Center (PKCC) located at Port Klang, Malaysia, which 
GDMA purchased in 2009 (Standifer, 2017). From 2009–2013, scheduling a Navy aircraft 
carrier port visit to Port Klang became the primary objective of several Navy officials who 
allegedly accepted gifts, hotel rooms, cash, entertainment, meals, travel, and the services of 
prostitutes, in exchange for their efforts to schedule port visits at Port Klang (Complaint, 
United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013; Information, United States of 
America v. Dusek, 2015; Whitlock, 2016a). Leading up to a January 2012 port visit by the 
aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) to Port Klang, Malaysia, the Navy official in 
charge of the ships’ schedules for the Seventh Fleet allegedly accepted items of value in 
exchange for attempts to route the ship to Port Klang (Complaint, United States of America 
v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013). Ultimately, the Navy official was successful in lobbying his 
superiors to schedule the visit (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and 
Misiewicz, 2013). According to analysis conducted by the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA), the Navy was overbilled by over $500,000 for the port visit (Complaint, United 
States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013).  
(2) Solicitation Planning 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the solicitation planning 
phase primarily consisted of Navy officials sending classified ships’ schedules to GDMA in 
advance of the requests for proposal for a particular port visit being released by Navy 
contracting personnel (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Sanchez, 2013). 
Illegally sending these advance schedules allowed GDMA to mobilize its own assets, such as 
barges or tugboats, to far-away ports to service the Navy ships. This resulted in the Navy 
overpaying for services (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 
2013).  
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The remaining alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the solicitation 
planning phase consisted of Navy officials making specific arrangements during port visits 
that were beneficial to GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, 
Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). This included 
directing specific mooring arrangements for ships that would result in increased revenues for 
GDMA and increased costs for the Navy (Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, 
Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). Additional 
allegations of procurement fraud occurring in this phase consisted of Navy officials 
providing GDMA with internal Navy data such as cost containment strategies for upcoming 
port visits and internal data relating to pending solicitations (Complaint, United States of 
America v. Francis and Sanchez, 2013). 
(3) Solicitation 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the solicitation phase 
primarily consisted of the Navy’s failure to identify fictitious vendor quotes submitted by 
GDMA (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). This resulted in the Navy awarding contracts to 
GDMA for incidental items associated with port visits instead of awarding these orders to 
local contractors who could potentially provide the good or service at terms or prices more 
favorable to the Navy (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013; 
Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). This lack of competition led 
to higher costs. This failure to identify fictitious invoices also caused the Navy to accept bulk 
fuels that were fraudulently represented by GDMA to be of a specific grade when in reality 
they were not (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013). The remaining 
allegations of procurement fraud aligned under the solicitation phase consisted of Navy 
officials providing GDMA with competitor pricing data and internal Navy data pertaining to 
the Navy’s solicitation process in exchange for items of value (Complaint, United States of 
America v. Francis and Sanchez, 2013). 
(4) Source Selection 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the source selection phase 
primarily consisted of efforts by Navy officials who had accepted items of value from 
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GDMA to exert influence on Navy contracting officials (Indictment, United States of 
America v. Simpkins, 2015; Singapore Government, 2015). These actions were taken to 
ensure contract awards would be made to GDMA, and that protest actions would be decided 
in GDMA’s favor (Information, United States of America v. Francis and Glenn Defense 
Marine (Asia) PTE. LTD., 2015; Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015; 
Singapore Government, 2015; Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016).  
The remaining alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the source 
selection phase consisted of Navy officials providing internal Navy data to GDMA. This data 
included contracts awarded to GDMA competitors and data pertaining to the methodology of 
source selection processes (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Sanchez, 
2013). Additional allegations of procurement fraud occurring in this phase included Navy 
civilian contracting officers awarding contracts to GDMA in exchange for accepting cash 
bribes and travel accommodations from GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Simpkins, 2015; Singapore Government, 2015). Later, these contracting officers allegedly 
took action to exercise options for these contracts despite internal Navy concerns about 
GDMA’s billing and pricing practices (Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 
2015). 
(5) Contract Administration 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract administration 
phase primarily consisted of Navy officials accepting items of value from GDMA during 
Navy port visits (Information, United States of America v. Malaki, 2015; Information, United 
States of America v. Debord, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, 
Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). In return for 
accepting items, these Navy officials provided GDMA with assurances that the conspiracy to 
defraud the Navy would continue indefinitely (Information, United States of America v. 
Francis and Glenn Defense Marine (Asia) PTE. LTD., 2015; Indictment, United States of 
America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 
2017).  
 In exchange for items of value that were accepted during port visits in which GDMA 
had been awarded a contract or delivery order, Navy officials allegedly took actions and 
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committed to take future actions to route Navy ships to “pearl ports” (Complaint, United 
States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013, p. 5). Navy officials committed to 
pressuring contracting officers to make awards to GDMA and to suppressing negative 
information relating to GDMA’s actual performance (Indictment, United States of America 
v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, 
Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). These officials also allegedly took 
actions and committed to future efforts to suppress challenges to GDMA billings and prices, 
to suppress competition, and to provide to competitor price information to GDMA 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Sanchez, 2013; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017). Additionally, the Navy officials also allegedly pledged to continue to 
provide GDMA with internal Navy data and classified ships’ schedules (Complaint, United 
States of America v. Francis and Sanchez, 2013; Complaint, United States of America v. 
Layug, 2014; Information, United States of America v. Malaki, 2015; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017). The costs for the items of value provided to these officials are alleged to 
have been fraudulently included by GDMA in the port visit invoices paid by the Navy 
(Information, United States of America v. Debord, 2016; Whitlock, 2016a). 
The remaining alleged acts that aligned under the contract administration phase also 
included actions taken by a civilian supervisory contracting officer at Fleet Industrial Supply 
Center Singapore, Detachment Singapore, who had previously accepted and continued to 
receive items of value from GDMA, to derail efforts by Navy officials to challenge invoices 
submitted by GDMA (Complaint, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). This Navy 
civilian supervisory contracting officer is alleged to have ordered his subordinates to stop 
using collection, holding, and transfer (CHT) flow meters (Indictment, United States of 
America v. Simpkins, 2015). This removed the Navy’s ability to measure the actual volume 
of sewage waste removed from ship and provided to GDMA for disposal. 
Additional alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract 
administration phase include the Navy’s failure to detect that it was fraudulently invoiced 
and overcharged by GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). 
In this phase, the Navy also failed to detect that GDMA used fictitious vendors to submit 
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quotes for incidental (un-priced) husbanding services (Indictment, United States of America 
v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). In this phase, the Navy also failed to detect GDMA’s fraudulent 
representation of fuel supplied to Navy ships in Thailand (Complaint, United States of 
America v. Wisidagama, 2013). 
Finally, the alleged conduct of the three Navy admirals censured by the Secretary of 
the Navy aligns under the contract administration phase These admirals allegedly accepted 
gifts (models of Navy ships), extravagant meals, and cigars from GDMA at costs well below 
the market value during a port visit in 2006 (Larter, 2015). One Navy admiral allegedly used 
GDMA to arrange a tour of Hong Kong and to secure a luxury hotel room. These were 
services outside the scope of the Navy’s contract with GDMA and services for which the 
Admiral did not pay GDMA (Larter, 2015). 
(6) Contract Closeout Phase 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract closeout phase 
primarily consisted of Navy officials illegally providing GDMA with internal Navy data 
relating to port visits (Information, United States of America v. Debord, 2016; Indictment, 
United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, 
Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). The officials also allegedly furnished GDMA with internal Navy 
data regarding Navy efforts and intentions to challenge questionable bills and invoices 
submitted by GDMA (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Sanchez, 2013; 
Indictment, United States of America v. Pitts, 2016). 
Also included in this phase are allegations that Navy officials furnished GDMA with 
internal Navy communications regarding the Navy’s complaints about GDMA’s service 
levels following port visits (Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016; 
Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
Alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract closeout phase also 
included Navy officials, in exchange for items of value, pressuring other Navy officials to 
remit payment to GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, 
Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). This pressure was applied 
when GDMA’s invoices were presumably being questioned (Information, United States of 
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America v. Cantu, 2017). Other allegations of procurement fraud occurring in this phase 
included improper payments by the Navy on invoices that used fraudulent subcontractor and 
port tariff data. The Navy made improper payments to GDMA for services that GDMA did 
not allegedly provide (Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014; 
Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013). 
Alleged acts of procurement fraud that also aligned under the contract closeout phase 
included efforts by GDMA to influence future actions by Navy contracting officers by 
having Navy officials issue “Bravo Zulu” messages and letters in exchange for items of value 
(Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). These correspondences described GDMA’s 
support of a particular port visit in glowing terms. These correspondences could later be used 
by GDMA to establish a satisfactory past performance record, a criterion used in the source 
selection process for most government contracts (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, 
Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017).  
Furthermore, included in this phase were allegations that Navy officials submitted 
contractor performance evaluations of GDMA to Navy contracting officers that had been 
ghost written by GDMA employees (Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016). 
Finally, allegations of procurement fraud occurring in the contract closeout phase included 
efforts by Navy officials, in exchange for items of value, to quash and prevent Navy 
contracting officers from learning about customers concerns and complaints about GDMA 
service levels (Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017) 
(7) “Other” 
As depicted in Table 1, 219 alleged acts of procurement fraud could not be aligned 
under any of the six phases of the contract management process. These alleged acts were 
aligned under a phase called “other.” These alleged acts predominately consisted of 
allegations that involved Navy officials who were once directly involved in the GDMA 
conspiracy and later left the conspiracy due to reassignment within the Navy. According to 
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these allegations, these officials subsequently attempted to obtain items of value from 
GDMA such as cash, the services of prostitutes, and employment opportunities, despite the 
fact that these officials no longer occupied positions that allowed them to execute official 
acts or influence acts that would enrich GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Simpkins, 2015; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, 
Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). Other allegations of fraud aligned with 
the “other” phase included acts of alleged collusion between a Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS) agent and GDMA (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and 
Beliveau, 2013). 
b. Seller’s Side 
The findings from the analysis of the alleged acts of procurement fraud for seller’s 
side of the contract management process provide a mirror image of the alleged acts of fraud 
from the buyer’s side. However, these acts of alleged fraud are stated in terms of alleged 
actions taken by GDMA.  
(1) Pre-sales Activity 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the pre-sales activity phase 
primarily consisted of efforts by GDMA and Francis to influence Navy ships’ schedules. 
Specifically, GDMA allegedly provided Navy officials with items of value, and in exchange 
for these items, Navy officials worked to route Navy ships to “pearl ports” (Complaint, 
United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013, p. 5; Information, United States of 
America v. Dusek, 2015; Whitlock, 2016a). One specific allegation is that GDMA and 
Francis provided a Navy official with items of value in exchange for lobbying and pressuring 
State Department and Navy officials to schedule an aircraft carrier port visit to Sepangar, 
Malaysia, in late 2012 (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 
2013). Ultimately, the Navy official was successful in lobbying State Department and Navy 
officials to schedule the visit (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 
2013). Prior to finalizing the schedule for the visit of the aircraft carrier USS JOHN C. 
STENNIS to Sepangar, Malaysia, in September 2012, the Officer-in-Charge of Fleet 
Logistics Support Center Yokosuka, Detachment Singapore warned the Navy official in 
charge of scheduling that the planned visit by a carrier to Sepangar presented serious risk 
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(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013). The Officer-in-
Charge offered three contracting options to support the visit. “(1) Support the visit using the 
region 2 contract (GDMA is the holder), which [the OIC] stated had a ‘[h]igh [e]xecution 
[r]is and [p]rice risk’; (2) award a separate contract specifically for Sepangar; (3) change the 
location of the port visit” (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 
2013, p. 19). The Navy official in charge of ship scheduling argued very strongly for option 1 
and ultimately succeeded in scheduling the visit (Complaint, United States of America v. 
Francis and Misiewicz, 2013). For that visit, GDMA billed the Navy for a total price 
$2,700,000 (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013). 
According to analysis conducted by DCAA, in 2011, the average of two aircraft carrier port 
visits at other ports in Malaysia only cost the Navy $1,360,0000 (Complaint, United States of 
America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013). The aircraft carrier USS George Washington 
(CVN 73) also completed a port visit in a “pearl port” later that year, specifically, Port 
Klang, Malaysia, in October 2012. The port visit came at cost to the Navy of over $1,800,000 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013).  
Other alleged acts procurement fraud that aligned under the pre-sales activity phase 
included alleged efforts by GDMA to continuously furnish Navy officials with items of value 
to prolong and continue GDMA’s procurement fraud conspiracy of routing Navy ships to 
“pearl ports” (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013, p. 5; 
Information, United States of America v. Dusek, 2015; Indictment, United States of America 
v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
GDMA also allegedly requested and received competitor pricing data following specific port 
visits that were supported by GDMA competitors (Complaint, United States of America v 
Francis and Sanchez, 2013; Complaint, United States of America v. Layug, 2014; 
Information, United States of America v. Malaki, 2015; Information, United States of 
America v. Debord, 2016). In addition, GDMA also allegedly requested and received internal 
Navy data and communications concerning the Navy’s planned strategy data relating to 
husbanding and cost reduction efforts (Complaint, United States of America v Francis and 
Sanchez, 2013). 
Alleged acts of procurement fraud that also aligned under the pre-sales activity phase 
included actions by GDMA to influence future actions by Navy contracting officers by 
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having Navy officials issue “Bravo Zulu” messages and letters in exchange for items of value 
(Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). These correspondences described GDMA’s 
support of a particular port visit in glowing terms. These correspondences could later be used 
by GDMA to establish a satisfactory past performance record, a criterion used in the source 
selection process for most government contracts (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
Included in this phase were also allegations that employees of GDMA ghost wrote GDMA 
performance evaluations and demanded Navy officials to submit these evaluations to Navy 
contracting officers (Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016). Finally, 
allegations of procurement fraud included in this phase were alleged actions taken by GDMA 
to influence future actions by Navy contracting officers by requesting Navy officials to 
submit false official complaints pertaining to the GDMA competitors (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, 
Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
(2) Bid or No Bid Decision Making 
The research did not identify any alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under 
the bid or no bid decision making phase. This was because relevant allegations of fraud 
found in the publicly available documents pertained only to husbanding actions in which it 
appeared that GDMA had determined that it would submit a bid or proposal. 
(3) Bid or Proposal Preparation 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the bid or proposal 
preparation phase primarily consisted of GDMA receiving classified ships’ schedules. 
Illegally receiving these schedules in advance of a husbanding service contract RFP allowed 
GDMA to mobilize its own assets, such as barges or tugboats, to distant ports (Complaint, 
United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013). Using its own assets to provide 
services was much cheaper than relying on subcontractors and increased its profit 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013).  
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Other alleged acts of procurement fraud also occurring in the bid or proposal 
preparation phase consisted of efforts taken by GDMA to create fictitious vendors to win 
contract awards for incidental (un-priced) items associated with port visits (Indictment, 
United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014; Complaint, United States of America v. 
Wisidagama, 2013). In this phase, GDMA also allegedly made fraudulent representations 
regarding bulk fuel it proposed to sell to the Navy (Complaint, United States of America v. 
Wisidagama, 2013). GDMA also allegedly demanded Navy officials to design specific 
mooring configurations for specific port visits (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). These 
arrangements, if enacted, would enhance GDMA’s revenues. 
During this phase, GDMA also allegedly received proprietary Navy data pertaining to 
the Navy’s treatment and strategy for managing port visit costs (Complaint, United States of 
America v Francis and Sanchez, 2013). GDMA is also alleged to have received internal Navy 
data describing port visit requirements and internal data relating to pending solicitations 
(Complaint, United States of America v Francis and Sanchez, 2013; Other allegations of 
procurement fraud occurring in the bid or proposal preparation phase consisted of GDMA 
allegedly receiving proprietary competitor pricing (Complaint, United States of America v 
Francis and Sanchez, 2013). This information assisted GDMA in constructing its proposals 
and influencing contract negotiations. 
(4) Contract Negotiation and Formation 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract negotiation and 
formation phase primarily consisted of efforts taken by GDMA to bribe navy officials to 
exert influence on Navy contracting officials (Complaint, United States of America v. 
Francis and Misiewicz, 2013; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, 
Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). Other allegations occurring 
in this phase consisted of efforts taken by GDMA to bribe contracting officers to award 
contracts to GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015; Singapore 
Government, 2015).  
Furthermore, still other alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the 
contract negotiation and formation phase consisted of GDMA receiving proprietary 
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competitor data and internal Navy information (Complaint, United States of America v 
Francis and Sanchez, 2013). This information pertained to contracts awarded to GDMA 
competitors and included internal Navy data pertaining to the methodology of the source 
selection process for particular contract awards (Complaint, United States of America v 
Francis and Sanchez, 2013). 
(5) Contract Administration 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contact administration 
phase consisted of efforts taken by GDMA to provide Navy officials with items of value 
(Information, United States of America v. Malaki, 2015; Information, United States of 
America v. Debord, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, 
Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). These allegations occurred 
during Navy ship port visits in which the Navy had awarded a contract to GDMA 
(Information, United States of America v. Malaki, 2015; Information, United States of 
America v. Debord, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, 
Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). In exchange for items of 
value, GDMA was assured by Navy officials that its conspiracy to defraud the Navy would 
continue (Information, United States of America v. Francis and Glenn Defense Marine 
(ASIA) PTE., 2015; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, 
Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). Specifically, GDMA was 
assured by Navy officials that they would continue to route Navy ships to “pearl ports,” 
pressure Navy contracting officers to make awards to GDMA, and suppress negative 
information relating to GDMA’s actual performance (Indictment, United States of America 
v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, 
Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). Based on these assurances and 
exchanges of value, GDMA later requested these officials to suppress challenges to GDMA 
billings and prices, suppress competition, and provide GDMA with competitor price 
information (Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017). GDMA was also assured these Navy officials would provide and continue to 
provide GDMA with internal Navy data and classified ships’ schedules (Information, United 
States of America v. Malaki, 2015; Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016; 
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Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). The costs for the items of value provided to these 
officials are alleged to have been fraudulently included by GDMA in the port visit invoices 
paid by the Navy (Information, United States of America v. Debord, 2016; Whitlock, 2016a). 
Other alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract administration 
phase also included GDMA requesting a civilian supervisory contracting officer at Fleet 
Industrial Supply Center Singapore, Detachment Singapore, who had previously accepted 
and continued to receive items of value from GDMA, to derail efforts by Navy officials in 
Hong Kong who sought to challenge invoices submitted by GDMA (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). At the request of GDMA, this Navy civilian 
supervisory contracting officer is alleged to have ordered his subordinates to stop using CHT 
flow meters (Complaint, United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). This removed the 
Navy’s ability to measure the actual volume of sewage waste removed from ship and 
provided to GDMA for disposal. 
Finally, the alleged conduct of the three Navy admirals censured by the Secretary of 
the Navy were aligned under the contract administration phase. These admirals allegedly 
accepted gifts (models of Navy ships), extravagant meals, and cigars from GDMA at costs 
well below the market value during a port visit in 2006 (Larter, 2015). One Navy admiral 
allegedly used GDMA to arrange a tour of Hong Kong and to secure a luxury hotel room. 
These were services outside the scope of the Navy’s contract with GDMA and services for 
which the admiral did not pay GDMA (Larter, 2015). 
(6) Contract closeout  
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract closeout phase 
primarily consisted of GDMA obtaining internal Navy data relating to port visits (e.g., after 
action reports) (Information, United States of America v. Debord, 2016; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017). GDMA also received internal Navy data regarding Navy efforts and 
intentions to challenge questionable bills and invoices submitted by GDMA (Complaint, 
United States of America v Francis and Sanchez, 2013). Allegations that GDMA received 
internal Navy communications regarding the Navy’s complaints about GDMA’s service 
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levels following port visits are included in this phase (Complaint, United States of America v 
Francis and Sanchez, 2013; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, 
Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
Alleged acts of procurement fraud that aligned under the contract closeout phase also 
included GDMA requesting Navy officials to pressure other Navy officials to remit payment 
to GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, 
Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017; Information, United States of America 
v. Cantu, 2017). This pressure was applied when GDMA’s invoices were presumably being 
questioned. Other allegations of procurement fraud occurring in this phase included improper 
payments by the Navy for invoices that used fraudulent subcontractor and port tariff data and 
payments to GDMA for services that were not provided to the Navy (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014; Complaint, United States of America v. 
Wisidagama, 2013). 
Alleged acts of procurement fraud also occurring in the contract closeout phase 
included GDMA efforts to have Navy officials issue “Bravo Zulu” messages and letters in 
exchange for items of value (Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, 
Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). These correspondences 
described GDMA’s support of a particular port visit in glowing terms. These 
correspondences could later be used by GDMA to establish a satisfactory past performance 
record, a criterion used in the source selection process for most government contracts 
(Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United States of America 
v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
Included in this phase were also allegations that employees of GDMA ghost wrote GDMA 
performance evaluations and demanded Navy officials to submit these evaluations to Navy 
contracting officers (Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016). Finally, 
allegations of procurement fraud also occurring in the contract closeout phase were requests 
by GDMA that concerns and complaints about GDMA service levels be quashed and be 
prevented from being presented to contracting officers (Indictment, United States of America 
v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, 
Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
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(7) “Other” 
As depicted in Table 2, 125 alleged acts of fraud could not be aligned under any of 
the six phases of the contract management process. These alleged acts were aligned under a 
phase called “other. These alleged acts consisted of allegations that involved Navy officials 
who were once directly involved in the GDMA conspiracy and later left the conspiracy due 
to reassignment within the Navy. According to these allegations, these officials subsequently 
attempted to obtain items of value from GDMA such as cash, the services of prostitutes, and 
employment opportunities, despite the fact that these officials no longer occupied positions 
that allowed them to execute official acts or influence acts that would enrich GDMA 
(Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). Other allegations of fraud aligned into the “other” 
phase included acts of alleged collusion between a Naval Criminal Investigative Service 
(NCIS) agent and GDMA (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 
2013). The alleged acts of fraud committed by GDMA personnel that aligned under this 
phase appear to have been perpetrated for the purposes of prolonging and concealing 
GDMA’s procurement fraud schemes (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and 
Beliveau, 2013); Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, 
Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017).  
2. Internal Controls 
a. Control Environment 
The allegations of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in the internal 
control component of control environment occurred because of an unethical climate and 
culture that developed within the top leadership component of the Navy’s 7th Fleet staff. In 
its 1987 report, the Treadway Commission explained, that “the tone set by top management 
that influences the corporate environment” is of overriding importance in preventing fraud 
within an organization (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Accounting Report, 
1987, p. 11). Additionally, allegations of procurement fraud occurred because of a lack of 
“standards, processes, and structures that provide the basis for carrying out internal control 
across the organization” (COSO, 2013, p. 4).  
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With the exception of one enlisted Navy sailor, the majority of personnel indicted by 
the federal courts have been Navy officers. A majority of these officers were in the paygrades 
of O5 and greater and served on the Navy’s 7th Fleet Staff at some point between 2006 and 
2013 (Whitlock, 2016a). The conspiracy to defraud the Navy was pervasive amongst top 
leaders who served in 7th Fleet staff positions. For example, from 22–25 May 2008, GDMA 
allegedly hosted a three-day party at a luxury hotel in Manila, Philippines for officers from 
the 7th Fleet staff. At this party, GDMA allegedly provided these officials with a rotating 
carousel of prostitutes. The partygoers are alleged to have drunk all of the hotel’s Dom 
Perignon champagne. The total cost of the party was estimated at $50,000 (Indictment, 
United States of America v. Newland, Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, 
Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). 
In addition, allegations of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in the 
control environment component include actions allegedly taken by Navy officials to assist 
GDMA in continuing its conspiracy to defraud the Navy. To accomplish this, GDMA allegedly 
hosted lavish dinners at ports of call for these officials and hosted “changing of the guard” 
dinners designed to recruit new members of the 7th Fleet staff into the conspiracy (Indictment, 
United States of America v. Newland, Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, 
Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). Additionally, Navy officials would furnish Francis with 
personality profiles of Navy officials to determine if they would be candidates to join the 
conspiracy (Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014; Indictment, United States 
of America v. Newland, Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017).  
Allegations of procurement fraud that occurred due to the deficiencies in the control 
environment component also included Navy civilian contracting officers awarding contracts 
to GDMA in exchange for accepting cash bribes and travel accommodations (Indictment, 
United States of America v. Simpkins, 2015; Singapore Government, 2015).  Later, these 
contracting officers allegedly took action to exercise options for these contracts despite 
internal Navy concerns about GDMA’s billing and pricing practices (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Simpkins, 2015). The research findings supported that GDMA allegedly 
was able to perpetrate procurement fraud against the Navy for a long period because of a lack 
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of standards, processes, and structure across the Navy’s husbanding contract management 
organizations.  
b. Risk Assessment 
This research study did not identify any instances in which risk assessment was the 
primary internal control deficiency that permitted the alleged acts of fraud to occur. This is 
because the allegations of fraud involve overt acts and the definition of risk assessment 
provided in Chapter II states that risk assessment involves “The identification, analysis, and 
management of risk faced by an organization” (Chang, 2013, p. 16). However, because fraud 
allegedly occurred, it can be argued that each act of alleged fraud could be aligned with the 
risk assessment component. Effective risk assessment would have prevented the alleged 
fraud from occurring. However, given the limitation of this research to align each alleged act 
of fraud with the primary internal control component that permitted the alleged act to occur, 
no alleged acts of fraud were aligned to risk assessment in this research study.  
c. Information and Communication 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in the internal 
component of information and communication occurred because of an abuse of classified and 
proprietary data. GAO (2001) explains, “That information should be recorded and 
communicated to management and others within the agency who need it and in a form and 
within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and operational 
responsibilities” (GAO, 2001, p. 51).  
In exchange for items of value, Navy officials allegedly provided GDMA with 
competitor pricing data, classified ships’ schedules, and internal Navy data pertaining to the 
contract management process. (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and 
Misiewicz, 2013; Complaint, United States of America v Francis and Sanchez, 2013; 
Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). GDMA also allegedly received internal Navy 
information pertaining to the criminal investigations that NCIS was pursuing against the firm 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 2013). This information 
assisted GDMA in constructing its contract proposals and influenced its contract negotiations 
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with the Navy. Additionally, GDMA was able to use the ships’ schedule information to 
mobilize its own assets, such as barges or tugboats, to far-away ports. Using its own assets to 
provide services was much cheaper than relying on subcontractors and increased its profit 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013).  
In the case of the NCIS agent in collusion with GDMA, GDMA received up-to- date 
information concerning the multiple investigations NCIS was pursuing against GDMA 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 2013). This allowed GDMA 
to remain ahead of the Navy and to make changes to internal GDMA processes that were 
under question by Navy investigators and contracting officials. For example, after a NCIS 
agent allegedly briefed GDMA on developments into an NCIS investigation into fraudulent 
billing practices, GDMA allegedly changed their business process related to billing 
procedures (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 2013). 
Specifically, GDMA changed their process to submit purported subcontractor bids using 
GDMA letterhead instead of submitting the falsified quotes directly to the contracting officer 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 2013). This had the effect of 
prolonging GDMA’s alleged conspiracy to defraud the Navy.  
d. Control Activities 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in the internal 
control component of control activities occurred because the Navy failed to execute “actions 
established through policies and procedures that help ensure that management’s directives to 
mitigate risks to the achievement of objectives are carried out” (COSO, 2013, p.4). Specific 
allegations of procurement fraud that occurred due to the Navy’s failure to properly execute 
control activities include actions by Navy officials to request items of value and directed the 
costs of those items to be fraudulently included in GDMA port visit invoices (Information, 
United States of America v. Debord, 2016). In these cases, the Navy rendered payment based 
on these invoices (Information, United States of America v. Debord, 2016). Also included 
are alleged efforts by GDMA to create fictitious vendors to win contract awards for 
incidental items associated with port visits (Complaint, United States of America v. 
Wisidagama, 2013; Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). The 
absence of control activities allowed GDMA to win contract awards despite a mandate for 
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competition (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). 
In addition, alleged acts of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in 
control activities include actions taken by Navy officials to pressure other Navy officials to 
remit payments to GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Newland, 
Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017). This pressure 
was typically applied when GDMA’s invoices were presumably being questioned. Other 
allegations of procurement fraud occurring in this phase include improper payments by the 
Navy for invoices that used fraudulent subcontractor and port tariff data and improper 
payments to GDMA for services that were not provided to the Navy (Complaint, United 
States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013; Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, 
Raja, 2014). 
e. Monitoring Activities 
The alleged acts of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in the internal 
control component of monitoring activities occurred because the Navy lacked “ongoing 
evaluations, separate evaluations, or some combination of the two” (COSO, 2013, p. 5). It 
should be noted that the number allegations of procurement fraud that occurred due to 
deficiencies in monitoring activities was a relatively low number. This is because the 
overwhelming majority of allegations of fraud involve single overt acts. In this research, the 
internal control component of monitoring activities was aligned with allegations of 
fraudulent acts that employed a particular fraud scheme over extended periods, or across 
similar activities. It was deficiencies in the Navy’s monitoring activities that permitted the 
alleged particular fraud schemes to occur over time and be perpetrated across similar 
activities.  
Specific alleged acts of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in 
monitoring activities included GDMA creating fraudulent port authorities and shell 
companies (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). Shell companies are fake businesses or entities 
that are established for the purpose of invoicing a company or the government for goods or 
services that it does not receive (Wells, 2002). GDMA is alleged to have submitted 
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fraudulent port tariff invoices using these fraudulent entities at inflated costs for ships 
making ports of call in Sepangar, Malaysia, Bali, Indonesia, Langkawi, Malaysia, and Ream, 
Cambodia (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013).  
Also included under monitoring activities are allegations that GDMA fraudulently 
represented fuel sales. GDMA allegedly told the Navy that the Government of Thailand 
required that ship fuels must contain a bio-diesel mix (Complaint, United States of America 
v. Wisidagama, 2013). As a result, GDMA allegedly stated that it would have to import fuel 
into Thailand to meet Navy and Thai government specifications. However, the government 
of Thailand imposed no such regulation (Complaint, United States of America v. 
Wisidagama, 2013). Allegedly, GDMA procured fuels from local vendors while purporting 
to import the fuels. According to an analysis by the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA), the losses to the United States on fuel charges in Thailand alone exceeded 
$3,000,000 for five fuel purchases in 2011 (Complaint, United States of America v. 
Wisidagama, 2013).  
Other alleged acts of procurement fraud that occurred due to deficiencies in 
monitoring activities include the Navy awarding contracts to GDMA up until Francis’ 
apprehension by federal authorities in 2013 (Perry, 2013; Standifer, 2017). As early as 
December 2006 concerns about GDMA’s excessively high costs were documented, yet the 
Navy continued to award contracts to the firm (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Simpkins, 2015; Whitlock, 2016b).  
3. Procurement Fraud Schemes 
Based on the research findings, collusion was the alleged fraud scheme that was 
prevalent in the Fat Leonard case. Each procurement fraud scheme that occurred will be 
analyzed and discussed in the next sections. 
a. Collusion  
The instances of collusion consisted of Navy officials allegedly receiving items of 
value from GDMA in exchange for performing and influencing the execution of official acts. 
In exchange for items of value, Navy officials provided GDMA with classified ships’ 
schedule information, vendor pricing information, and internal Navy data (Information, 
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United States of America v. Francis and Glenn Defense Marine (Asia) PTE. LTD., 2015; 
Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017).  Items of value received by Navy officials 
included gifts, hotel rooms, cash, prostitutes, entertainment, meals, and travel (Indictment, 
United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, 
Herrera, Gorsuch, 2017).   
In addition, acts of collusion also include allegations that Navy officials accepted 
items of value in exchange for efforts to schedule port visits in “pearl ports (Complaint, 
United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, 2013, p. 5) “Pearl ports” referred to ports 
of call for which the Navy had reduced visibility and GDMA had the opportunity to generate 
higher revenues for a particular port visit (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis 
and Misiewicz, 2013). Acts of collusion include allegations that Navy officials made specific 
arrangements during port visits that were beneficial to GDMA in exchange for items of 
value. This included directing specific mooring arrangements for ships that would result in 
increased revenues for GDMA and increased costs for the Navy (Indictment, United States of 
America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 
2017).   
Furthermore, acts of collusion also include allegations that Navy officials accepted 
items of value from GDMA in exchange for pressuring Navy contracting officers to make 
awards to GDMA and suppressed negative information relating to GDMA’s actual 
performance (Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 2016; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017). These officials allegedly also took actions and committed to future efforts to 
suppress challenges to GDMA billings and prices, pressure Navy officials to remit payments 
to GDMA for questionable invoices, and suppress GDMA’s competitors (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, 
Gorsuch, 2017).   
Acts of collusion also included allegations that Navy civilian contracting officers at 
Fleet Industrial Supply Center Yokosuka, Detachment Singapore, accepted cash bribes and 
travel accommodations from GDMA (Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 
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2015; Singapore Government, 2015). In exchange for cash and travel accommodations, these 
contracting officers allegedly took action to award GDMA long term IDIQ contracts for 
husbanding services in the Republic of the Philippines and Thailand (Indictment, United 
States of America v. Simpkins, 2015; Singapore Government, 2015). Later, these contracting 
officers allegedly took action to exercise options for these contracts despite internal Navy 
concerns about GDMA’s billing and pricing practices (Indictment, United States of America 
v. Simpkins, 2015). 
Collusion in this case also included alleged kickbacks between GDMA and 
subcontractors in Japan during the period of July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010 
(Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014). During this time, GDMA held the 
contract to provide husbanding support to U.S. Navy vessels making ports of call in Japan 
(Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014). Under the contract closeout process 
used by the Navy in support of this contract, GDMA subcontractors would submit their 
invoices directly to the Navy after completion of husbanding services (Information, United 
States of America v. Aruffo, 2014). Under this process, Navy shipboard personnel via a 
United States treasury check would make payment to these subcontractors (Information, 
United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014). Under this stratagem, GDMA allegedly required 
Japanese subcontractors to agree to overbill the Navy in order for that subcontractor to 
participate in the contract. After receiving payment, the subcontractor kicked back the 
overpayment to GDMA (Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014). This 
money was allegedly used by GDMA to fund the items of value provided to Navy officials 
participating in the conspiracy to defraud the Navy (Information, United States of America v. 
Aruffo, 2014). These items of value included gifts, hotel rooms, cash, prostitutes, 
entertainment, meals, and travel (Information, United States of America v. Francis and Glenn 
Defense Marine (Asia) PTE. LTD., 2015). The use of a kickback scheme allegedly allowed 
GDMA to purchase these items and keep these transactions off its official accounting record 
(Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 2014).  
Collusion in this case also included GDMA’s alleged recruitment of an NCIS agent 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 2013). In exchange for items 
of value, the NCIS agent allegedly provided GDMA with up-to-date information concerning 
the multiple investigations NCIS was pursuing against GDMA (Complaint, United States of 
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America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 2013). This allowed GDMA to remain ahead of the Navy 
and to make changes to internal GDMA processes that were under question by Navy 
investigators and procurement officials (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and 
Beliveau, 2013). This had the effect of prolonging GDMA’s conspiracy to defraud the Navy.  
b. Conflict of Interest 
The alleged acts in the conflict of interest scheme involved GDMA efforts to 
influence the contract management process. Specifically, these acts were aligned to the 
actions taken by the three admirals who were eventually censured by the Navy. These 
admirals allegedly accepted ship models, extravagant meals, and cigars at costs well below 
the market value (Larter, 2015). One Navy admiral allegedly used GDMA to arrange a tour 
of Hong Kong and reserve a luxury hotel room for which he did not pay (Larter, 2015). 
c. Billing, Cost, and Pricing Fraud schemes 
The billing, cost, and pricing fraud schemes consisted of alleged GDMA efforts to 
receive improper payments based off the submission of fraudulent subcontractor and port 
tariff invoices to the U.S. government (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 
2013; Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). GDMA inflated their 
payments and capitalized upon the Navy’s lack of procedural compliance and weak contract 
closeout processes. Specifically, GDMA created corporate letterhead and submitted quotes 
for companies and port authorities that did not exist. It is alleged that the services that 
GDMA claimed were performed by subcontractors were actually performed by GDMA at 
inflated rates (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013; Indictment, United 
States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). In the case of port tariffs, it is alleged that these 
costs were never incurred (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013; 
Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 2014). 
d. Bid Rigging 
The bid rigging fraud schemes consisted of alleged GDMA efforts to create fictitious 
vendors to win contract awards for incidental items associated with port visits. In accordance 
with the Navy Husbanding Service Region 2 contract, awarded to GDMA in the summer of 
2011, incidentals consisted of “items that fell within the general scope of husbanding services 
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but not enumerated as fixed price items” (Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, 
Raja, 2014, p. 3). GDMA was required to furnish the Navy contracting officer with at least 
two competitive quotes when an incidental service/supply was requested. Based on the 
publically available documents describing the Region 2 contract, GDMA was allowed to 
compete with other vendors to provide incidental services provided it disclosed in their quote 
to the contracting officer “any profit or markup” (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Peterson, Raja, 2014, p. 3). Along with its quote, “GDMA would also submit an Authorized 
Government Representative Form (AGR Form) in which it GDMA would recommend a 
source. After receiving the quotes and the AGR form, the Navy contracting officer would 
select which vendor to use for each incidental” (Indictment, United States of America v. 
Peterson, Raja, 2014, p. 3). After a Navy Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Agent, 
allegedly engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the Navy, briefed GDMA on classified 
information regarding NCIS’s investigation into GDMA, it is alleged that GDMA changed 
their business process (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 2013). 
Specifically, it is alleged that following this briefing, GDMA began to submit purported 
subcontractor bids using GDMA letterhead instead of submitting the falsified quotes directly 
to the contracting officer (Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, 
2013). 
e. Fraudulent Representations 
The fraudulent representations schemes involved allegations that GDMA inflated the 
price of fuel supplied to Navy ships and made other false representations concerning fuel 
purchases (Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013). Specifically, GDMA 
allegedly told the Navy that the Government of Thailand required that fuel contain a bio-
diesel mix, and as a result, GDMA would have to import fuel that met Navy specifications 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013). The Government of Thailand 
imposed no such regulation, and allegedly, GDMA procured fuels from local vendors. E-mail 
messages obtained by the investigators revealed that GDMA management was intimately 
aware of and involved in the orchestration of this fraud, directing the fuel purchases and 
billings for Navy ships and receiving profit and loss statements for each ship visit to Thailand 
(Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013). According to an analysis by 
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Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), the losses to the United States on fuel charges in 
Thailand alone exceeded $3,000,000 for five fuel purchases in 2011 (Complaint, United 
States of America v. Wisidagama, 2013).  
f. Fraudulent Purchases 
This research study did not identify any alleged acts of procurement fraud that fell 
under the category of the fraudulent purchases procurement fraud scheme based on the 
definition of fraudulent purchases used in this research study. Fraudulent purchases are 
defined as purchases made by a government buyer for personal use (Castillo & Flanagan, 
2014). 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON RESEARCH FINDINGS 
These recommendations, based on the research findings, focus on procurement fraud 
training, ethics training, contracting training, enhancing personnel competency, 
documentation control, control activities, and monitoring activities. If implemented, these 
recommendations may decrease the Navy’s vulnerability to procurement fraud when 
contracting for husbanding services. 
1. Create Husbanding Services Contracting Course 
As reflected in Figure 9, 26% of alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case 
occurred in the buyer’s contract administration phases, 19% occurred in the procurement 
planning phase, and 18% in the solicitation planning phase. These research findings 
demonstrate weaknesses in the competency of process stakeholders, the capability of 
husbanding services contract management processes, and knowledge of procurement fraud 
schemes. Given the unique nature of husbanding, and the disparate area of operations over 
which services are provided, differences in requirements, and turnover of personnel at 
overseas contracting offices, the Navy should coordinate with the Defense Acquisition 
University to develop a resident class on husbanding service contracting. Completion of the 
class should be mandatory for all enlisted Logistics Specialists, Supply Corps Officers, and 
civilian contracting work force personnel participating in husbanding contracting. The class 
should focus on husbanding requirements, the differences in requirements between the 
different ship types, Navy HSP processes, and market research techniques in foreign markets. 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 90 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
The class should also teach contract vehicle types and associated risks, cost realism and cost 
reasonableness analysis, internal controls, lessons learned, and best practices that can be 
employed through each of the six phases of the contract management process. The class 
should also teach methods to detect procurement fraud. 
2. Incorporate Specifics from the Fat Leonard Case into Ethics Training 
As reflected in Figure 11, deficiencies in the control environment component 
accounted for 52% of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case. GAO found that 
ethical behavior, employee competence, and organization structure are the key factors that 
dictate the control environment. In addition, management must set the example and display 
integrity and ethical behavior (GAO, 1999). To foster an ethical environment, set an ethical 
tone from the top, and employ lessons learned from this case, the Navy should incorporate 
specifics from the Fat Leonard case into ethics training conducted in officer accession 
programs, service schools, and leadership classes for both officers and enlisted personnel. 
3. Protect Classified Ships’ Schedule Information 
As reflected in Figure 11, deficiencies in the information and communication 
component accounted for 38% of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case. The 2014 
Naval Audit Service report asserted that the Navy’s 5th and 6th Fleets did not have sufficient 
controls in place over the management of classified ships’ schedules. The research showed 
that a majority of procurement fraud occurring in the Navy’s solicitation planning phase and 
in GDMA’s bid or proposal preparation phase were related to the Navy officials providing 
GDMA with classified ships’ schedules. Since illegally leaking ships’ schedules to HSPs 
violates the laws concerning the preservation of classified information and provides illegal 
advantages to HSPs, the Navy should heed the Naval Audit Service’s recommendation. The 
Naval Audit Service stated the numbered Fleets should take action to “limit access to ships’ 
schedules to authorized individuals with a need to know, and assign and maintain 
accountability for their custody and use” (Naval Audit Service, 2014, p. 23). 
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4. Protect Proprietary and Internal Government Data 
As reflected in Figure 11, deficiencies in the information and communication 
component accounted for 38% of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case. The 
research findings showed that a significant number of the allegations of procurement fraud 
occurring in the Navy’s solicitation planning phase and solicitation phase consisted of 
GDMA receiving competitor pricing data and internal Navy data. Additionally, GDMA was 
able to obtain criminal investigative reports. This allowed GDMA to evade criminal 
investigators and modify its procurement fraud schemes. Accordingly, the Navy should take 
steps to establish firewalls within the Navy contracting organizations and NCIS to mitigate 
and prevent the leaking of proprietary and internal government data. 
5. Improve and Enhance Control Activities 
As reflected in Figure 11, deficiencies in control activities accounted for 9% of the 
alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case. Efforts to enhance the auditability of 
contracting organizations by instituting control activities in each phase are recommended. 
Specific recommendations include the deployment of husbanding contracting officers and 
CORs to the port visit site, installation of flow meters on all Navy ships to measure actual 
volumetric wastes removed, the use of approved qualified vendor lists to verify 
subcontractors and HSP quotations, and procedures to install strong verification processes in 
the contract closeout phase. This should help deter and prevent improper payments. 
6. Improve and Enhance Monitoring Activities 
As reflected in Figure 11, deficiencies in monitoring activities only accounted for 1% 
of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case. However, ongoing evaluations that 
validate the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures in the organization are vital to 
deter procurement fraud. As a result, efforts to enhance the auditability of contracting 
organizations by instituting monitoring activities are recommended. The establishment of a 
holistic organizational monitoring program, exclusive of the Navy’s Procurement 
Performance Management Program (PPMAP) is recommended. The program should include 
periodic and systematic reviews and comparisons of contract management files by personnel 
both within the contract management organization and by personnel from an independent 
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Navy organization. Review efforts should focus on gauging the value received by the Navy 
in terms of satisfying cost, schedule, and performance requirements. This program should 
also focus on process improvement. Best practices, lessons learned, deficiencies, and 
vulnerabilities should be captured in a lessons learned database. The database should be 
accessible by all Navy contracting officers that execute husbanding service contracts. Finally, 
an assessment of procurement fraud should be incorporated into the monitoring program to 
ensure early recognition and detection of procurement fraud schemes. Management support 
and commitment are required to apply lessons learned from this process and make changes to 
future contracts that incorporate risk assessment considerations. 
7. Create and Mandate Procurement Fraud Training 
As reflected in Figure 12, nearly 92% of the acts of alleged fraud in the Fat Leonard 
case were categorized as collusion. Given the long period of time during which this fraud 
allegedly occurred, this research finding suggests that contracting personnel, to include 
contracting officer’s representatives, personnel interacting with HSPs, and DOD criminal 
investigators, were weak on recognizing procurement fraud indicators. The research findings 
also show that contracting personnel in particular did not contemplate vulnerabilities and 
possible procurement fraud schemes when structuring contract vehicles. As previously stated 
in Chapter II, past research has shown DOD contracting officers have low knowledge levels 
of procurement fraud and internal controls and yet perceive their organizations to not be 
vulnerable to fraud (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). To address this lack of knowledge and 
consistent with previous research, it is recommended all Navy acquisition work force 
personnel be required to complete mandatory training on procurement fraud indicators 
(Rendon & Rendon, 2016). Although the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) has a 
continuous learning module (CLM 049) on procurement fraud indicators and a course (AUD 
1283) on fraud awareness, these courses are not mandated for Navy acquisition work force 
personnel and criminal investigators. Completion of this course and periodic refresher 
training should be mandatory. Additionally, the Navy should mandate all officers and 
enlisted personnel in the Logistics Specialist rating to complete the procurement fraud 
indicators continuous learning module as part of General Military Training (GMT) 
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requirements. Moreover, civilian NCIS agents should also be mandated to complete the 
procurement fraud indicators continuous learning module annually. 
Although NCIS agents may be knowledgeable of procurement fraud indicators, they 
may not be knowledge about the contract management process. It is recommended that the 
Navy emulate the U.S. Air Force’s strategy of sending Office of Special Investigation agents 
to degree programs in contract management by sending NCIS agents to these programs also. 
Additionally, the Navy should ensure that all senior level executives (O7 and above, 
and civilian equivalent) are provided with high level knowledge about the intricacies and 
vulnerabilities of the contract management process. The Naval Postgraduate School Center 
for Executive Education provides a course on what senior executives need to know about 
contracting. This training focuses on how contracting affects the mission of the organizations 
led by these executives. It is recommended that all Flag officers and their civilian equivalents 
complete this course. 
8. Develop a Cadre of Husbanding Service Contract Management Experts 
The research findings, when considered in totality, show that deficiencies in the 
competency of personnel, weaknesses in the capability of husbanding services contracting 
processes, and ineffective internal controls were the primary reasons GDMA was able 
perpetrate procurement fraud against the Navy for such a long period of time. Navy civilian 
employees employed by the Fleet Logistics Centers (FLCs) primarily perform husbanding 
services contracting management. Because of DOD restrictions limiting civilian employees 
to a maximum of five years overseas, there is the potential for a large turnover among 
civilian contracting officers. This is particularly challenging in the husbanding service 
contract management, which is replete with unique requirements and foreign market research 
challenges. To mitigate these risks, it is recommended that the Navy take action to develop a 
cadre of both civilian and military husbanding services contract management experts. This 
cadre of personnel would consist of personnel with competency in requirements generation, 
as well as contracting officers, and contracting officer’s representatives. Upon designation as 
a husbanding service expert, these personnel could be more easily identifiable for overseas 
contracting assignments. Specific to uniformed personnel, the Navy should consider 
establishing a Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC) code for enlisted personnel and 
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Additional Qualification Designations (AQDs) for Navy Officers with expertise in 
husbanding contract management. This will assist the Bureau of Naval Personnel in the 
assignment of qualified and experienced personnel to key husbanding contract management 
positions. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the findings, analysis, implications, and recommendations 
based on the analysis of the Fat Leonard case. First, the research findings were presented. 
Next, an analysis of the procurement fraud schemes, contract management phases in which 
the fraud schemes occurred, and the internal control components that were deficient and 
allowed the fraud schemes to occur were presented. Finally, based on the analysis and 
implications of these findings, recommendations to enhance the competency of all HSP 
process stakeholders, improve Navy HSP contract process capabilities, and strengthen HSP 
contracting internal control were provided. The next chapter summarizes the research, 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMMARY 
For over 25 years, the U.S. Navy contracted with a Singapore-based firm, Glenn 
Defense Marine Asia (GDMA), to provide husbanding services for ships making port calls in 
the Asia/Pacific region. In 2013, the Department of Justice publicly revealed that, for years, 
GDMA had secured husbanding service contracts and conducted business through illicit 
procurement fraud schemes. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze Navy husbanding services contracting using 
the Fat Leonard case through the lens of auditability theory, applying contract management 
and internal control frameworks. Auditability theory states that a procurement organization 
can reduce its vulnerability to procurement fraud by emphasizing the competency of its 
personnel, developing capable contract management processes, and establishing effective 
internal controls. This research analyzes each alleged act of fraud in the Fat Leonard case. 
Each act was categorized into one of the six most common procurement fraud schemes. 
Additionally, each alleged act was aligned with the contract management phase in which the 
preponderance of the alleged act occurred and aligned with the internal control component 
that most contributed to and allowed the alleged fraudulent act to be perpetrated.  
This research identified deficiencies in the Navy’s personnel competency, husbanding 
contract management processes, internal controls. Based on the research findings, 
recommendations were provided to the Navy to improve the auditability of Navy husbanding 
service contracting. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
This research focused on three research questions. The answers to these research 
questions based on the findings of the research are discussed next. 
1. In which contracting processes did the alleged acts of procurement fraud 
occur in the Fat Leonard case relating to Navy husbanding services? 
As reflected in Figure 9, 26% of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case 
occurred in the contract administration phase. In addition, 19.0% of the alleged acts occurred 
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in the procurement planning phase, 18.0% in the solicitation planning phase, and 18.0% in 
the “other” phase. Approximately 12.0% of the alleged acts occurred in the contract closeout 
phase. Additionally, 4.0% of the alleged acts occurred in the solicitation phase, while 3.0% 
occurred in the source selection phase.  
As reflected in Figure 10, 30.0% of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case 
occurred in the pre-sales activity phase. In addition, 26.0% of the alleged acts occurred in the 
contract administration phase and 22.0% occurred in the bid or proposal preparation phase. 
Approximately, 10% of the alleged acts occurred in the “other” phase. Furthermore, 9% of 
the alleged acts occurred in the contract closeout phase, while 3% occurred in the contract 
negotiation and formation phase. This research study did not identify any allegations of fraud 
that occurred in the bid or no bid decision making phase. This was because relevant 
allegations of fraud found in the publicly available documents pertained only to husbanding 
actions in which it appeared that GDMA had determined that it would submit a bid or 
proposal. 
2. What internal controls were deficient that permitted the alleged acts of 
procurement fraud to occur in the Fat Leonard case relating to Navy 
husbanding services? 
As reflected in Figure 10, deficiencies in the control environment component 
accounted for 52.0% of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard case. The Information 
and communication component accounted for 38.0% and the control activities component 
accounted for 9.0% of the alleged fraudulent acts. Finally, the monitoring activities 
component accounted for 1.0% of the alleged fraudulent acts. This research study did not 
identify any instances in which risk assessment was the primary internal control deficiency 
that permitted the alleged acts of fraud to occur. This is because the allegations of fraud 
involve overt acts and the definition of risk assessment provided in Chapter II states that risk 
assessment involves “The identification, analysis, and management of risk faced by an 
organization” (Chang, 2013, p. 16). However, because fraud allegedly occurred, it can be 
argued that each act of alleged fraud could be aligned with the risk assessment component. 
Effective risk assessment would have prevented the alleged fraud from occurring. However, 
given the limitation of this research to align each alleged act of fraud with the primary 
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internal control component that allowed the alleged act to occur, no alleged acts of fraud 
were aligned to risk assessment in this research study.  
3. What were the specific alleged procurement fraud schemes that occurred in 
the Fat Leonard case relating to Navy husbanding services? 
As reflected in Figure 12, nearly 92% of the alleged acts of fraud in the Fat Leonard 
case were categorized as collusion. In addition, 4% of the alleged acts of fraud were 
categorized as billing, cost, and pricing schemes, and 3.0% of the alleged acts of fraud were 
categorized as bid rigging. Approximately, 1.0% of the alleged acts of fraud were categorized 
as conflict of interest, and approximately 0.41% of the alleged acts of fraud were categorized 
as fraudulent representations. This research study found no instances of fraudulent purchases 
based on the definition of fraudulent purchases. Fraudulent purchases were defined as 
purchases made by a government buyer for personal use (Castillo & Flanagan, 2014).  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There are several areas for further research that are suggested. One area for further 
research is to employ the methodology used in this study to other cases of procurement fraud 
within DOD. This research area will aid the DOD by analyzing real world cases to determine 
vulnerabilities in the contract management processes and in the internal control framework. 
Another area for further research is to assess the internal controls of organizations 
within DOD to determine their effectiveness. An additional area is to assess the contract 
management processes of DOD procurement organizations using Rendon’s Contract 
Management Maturity Model. These two recommended research areas will aid the DOD is 
deterring procurement fraud. 
Furthermore, another area for further research is to continue assessing the 
competency of DOD contracting officers in the areas of contract management and 
procurement fraud. This research will aid the DOD in enhancing the auditability of contract 
management organizations and help deter procurement fraud. 
Finally, this case should be revisited once all of the court documents have been 
unsealed and released to the public. At the time of this writing, a number of court documents 
remained sealed. These documents are vital to identifying which criminal offenses were used 
to convict the suspects. With total access to all court documents related to the criminal case, 
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supplementary analysis could be produced to further aid the DOD in deterring procurement 
fraud. Additional analysis could focus on identifying deficiencies in the secondary and 
tertiary internal control components that allowed acts of procurement fraud to occur. 
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APPENDIX. WORKS CONSULTED 
The following sources were used to construct the Fat Leonard Fraud Database, which 
is discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this study. 
 
Complaint, United States of America v. Francis, and Beliveau, No. 13MJ3456 (S.D. Cal. 
Sep. 12, 2013). 
Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Misiewicz, No. 13MJ3457 (S.D. Cal. 
Sep. 12, 2013). 
Complaint, United States of America v. Francis and Sanchez, No. 13MJ4027 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 
1, 2013). 
Complaint, United States of America v. Layug, No. 14MJ1402 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014). 
Complaint, United States of America v. Simpkins, No. 15MJ0325 (S.D. Cal. Feb.2, 2015). 
Complaint, United States of America v. Wisidagama, No. 18MJ3783 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 
2013). 
Davis, K. (2015, December 3). Singapore woman charged in ‘Fat Leonard’ scandal. San 
Diego Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-leonard-
francis-singapore-arrest-kaur-2015dec03-story.html 
Indictment, United States of America v. Brooks, 16CR1206JLS (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2016). 
Indictment, United States of America v. Kapaun, 1700335SOM (Hon. H.I. May 24, 2017). 
Indictment, United States of America v. Misiewicz, 15CR0033JLS (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2015). 
Indictment, United States of America v. Newland, Deguzman, Hornbeck, Loveless, 
Lausman, Shedd, Herrera, Gorsuch, 17CR0623JLS (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017). 
Indictment, United States of America v. Peterson, Raja, 14CR3703JLS (S.D. Cal. Dec.23, 
2014). 
Indictment, United States of America v. Pitts, 16CR1207JLS (S.D. Cal. May 26, 2016). 
Indictment, United States of America v. Simpkins, 15CR0530JLS (S.D. Cal. Feb. 31, 2015). 
Information, United States of America v. Aruffo, 14CR1924JLS (S.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2014). 
Information, United States of America v. Cantu, 17CR2376JLS (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2017). 
Information, United States of America v. Debord, 16CR1457JLS (S.D. Cal. Jun. 23, 2016). 
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Information, United States of America v. Dusek, 15CR0131JLS (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015). 
Information, United States of America v. Francis and Glenn Defense Marine (Asia) PTE. 
LTD., 13CR4287JLS (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2015). 
Information, United States of America v. Gilbeau, 16CR1313JLS (S.D. Cal. Jun. 9, 2016). 
Information, United States of America v. Malaki, 15CR967WQH (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015). 
Information, United States of America v. Simpkins, 15CR0530JLS (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2016). 
Larter, D. (2015, Jul. 18). Navy rebukes 3 admirals for accepting dinners, gifts. Navy Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.navytimes.com  
Singapore Government. (2015). Underhand tactics for unfair advantage [Press release].  
Corrupt Practice Investigation Bureau. Retrieved from https://www.cpib.gov.sg/ 
Superseding Information, United States of America v. Beliveau, No. 13CR3781 (S.D. Cal. 
Dec. 17, 2013). 
Superseding Information, United States of America v. Sanchez, No. 13CR4287JLS (S.D. 
Cal. Jan. 6, 2015). 
USS Abraham Lincoln (CV 72). [2010]. Lincoln is underway [Facebook page]. Retrieved 
May 12, 2017, from https://www.facebook.com/USSLincoln/posts/115901168470523 
Whitlock, C. (2015, July 17). Three U.S. naval officers censured in ‘Fat Leonard’ corruption 
probe. Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com 
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